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## Off

FTC da

#### The FTC will enforce ‘right to repair’ now---it spurs growth and innovation, particularly in agriculture.

Minter ’21 [Adam; July 11; Columnist and author; Bloomberg, “Americans Must Reclaim Their Right to Repair,” <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-07-11/americans-must-reclaim-their-right-to-repair>]

When the Apple II personal computer was shipped in 1977, it came with a [detailed manual](https://archive.org/details/Apple_II_Mini_Manual/page/n49/mode/2up) for upgrading and repairing the device. Parts were readily available from Apple Inc. (and, later, other manufacturers), and if Apple owners didn’t want to fix or upgrade at home, they could find plenty of small, competitive repair businesses to do the work for them.

That was then. These days, Apple’s products arrive sealed shut, often with [proprietary screws](https://www.ifixit.com/News/9905/bit-history-the-pentalobe). Service manuals, circuit-board schematics and repair parts are [reserved](https://www.ifixit.com/News/43179/apple-endangers-our-business-model-gets-a-repairability-point-for-it) for Apple’s technicians, shops and a handful of “authorized” partners. With no access to parts, manuals or indie repair shops, consumers pay much more to keep their devices running.

President Joe Biden’s new executive order to promote competition encourages the Federal Trade Commission to end such anti-competitive repair monopolies. It’s a contentious move. Apple and the makers of other technological products from farm tractors to [35mm cameras](https://www.ifixit.com/News/1349/how-nikon-is-killing-camera-repair) argue that their repair monopolies are good for consumers. But as these monopolies have grown, their toll on consumers, the environment and American productivity and innovation has risen. Biden’s recognition of a “right to repair” can help lower these costs and, at the same time, spur new kinds of growth across the economy.

Repair has always been a part of American life. The first prairie farmers had no option but to repair their own carts and plows. When mechanization came along, farmers became expert technicians — so skilled that companies often consulted them on tractor designs. During the past 15 years, as computers have been integrated into expensive farm equipment, that relationship has broken down. The handful of remaining implement manufacturers make sure that only dealerships, with specialized software tools, can diagnose problems. Those same tools are often also needed to install parts and authorize repairs.

The costs to farmers can be significant. Paying a Deere & Co dealership to plug in a computer to clear an error code on a tractor or combine can cost [hundreds of dollars](https://www.vice.com/en/article/xykkkd/why-american-farmers-are-hacking-their-tractors-with-ukrainian-firmware) — not including transporting the tractor to the dealership. Worse, by limiting access to crucial diagnostic and repair tools, manufacturers cause significant delays during harvest, planting and other busy periods. At certain times, a piece of equipment immobilized for even a few hours can cost a farmer thousands of dollars.

As farmers lose money, farm manufacturers with parts and service businesses [profit handsomely](https://uspirg.org/feature/usp/deere-headlights). From 2013 to 2019, Deere & Co annual sales of new equipment declined 19%, to $23.7 billion, while sales of parts increased 22%, to $6.7 billion. Harvester manufacturers aren’t the only ones who’ve spotted a growth market in restricting access to repair. In 2019, Apple’s Tim Cook [conceded](https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/01/letter-from-tim-cook-to-apple-investors/) that lower-cost iPhone battery replacements had negatively impacted new iPhone sales. More expensive repairs, on the other hand, lead customers to think they may as well buy a new phone.

That’s bad for the buyers of Apple’s expensive new phones and even worse for lower-income consumers who rely on secondhand devices. Lack of competition in repair markets raises the cost of owning older devices, and ultimately accelerates their untimely, wasteful disposal.

The first calls to roll back manufacturer restrictions on repair, in the early 2010s, were focused on cars. But the problem now encompasses everything from phones to farm equipment. Since 2014, [32 states](https://www.repair.org/legislation) have considered so-called Fair Repair bills. Earlier this year, the New York legislature became the [first](https://states.repair.org/states/newyork/) to pass one.

But manufacturers have pushed hard to defeat such legislation. In 2017, Apple warned Nebraska lawmakers that Fair Repair “would make it very easy for hackers to relocate to Nebraska.” [TechNet](http://technet.org/), a trade group that represents Apple, Amazon Inc. and Google, has [warned](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-20/microsoft-and-apple-wage-war-on-gadget-right-to-repair-laws) several states that Fair Repair legislation would somehow jeopardize the safety of devices. (TechNet did not respond to requests for examples of such consumer safety threats.)

The federal government has not bought these arguments. In May, the Federal Trade Commission [reported](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2021/05/nixing-fix-report-explores-consumer-repair-issues) that “many of the explanations manufacturers gave for repair restrictions aren’t well-founded.” Biden’s executive order now encourages the FTC to “limit powerful equipment manufacturers from restricting people’s ability to use independent repair shops or do DIY repairs.”

#### The plan trades off.

Nylen ’20 [Leah; December 10; Antitrust journalist; Politico, “FTC suffering a cash crunch as it prepares to battle Facebook,” <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/10/ftc-cash-facebook-lawsuit-444468>]

The agency that just launched a landmark antitrust suit to break up Facebook is so strapped for cash that its leaders have discussed shrinking their staff and warned against taking on more cases.

In a series of emails to all Federal Trade Commission staff, obtained by POLITICO, Executive Director David Robbins said the agency would face a period of “belt tightening” to cut costs — and that filing fewer cases and trimming litigation expenses must be on the table.

“[W]e will either need to bring fewer expert intensive cases or significantly decrease our litigation costs (e.g. experts, transcripts, litigation support contractors, etc.),” Robbins said in an Oct. 29 email.

The emails offer an increasingly dire portrait of the money woes facing the FTC, which has launched a record amount of litigation in the past year even as the pandemic has caused a sharp reduction in the corporate merger filing fees that normally supply about half its budget. The crunch also raises the possibility that the FTC may not have the cash it needs to win its case against Facebook, which is gearing up for an expensive fight, or to take on additional companies like Amazon.

#### Extinction.

Castellaw ’18 [John; March 14; Lieutenant General in the United States Marine Corps, member of the Center for Climate and Security’s Advisory Board, teaching fellow in the College of Business and Global Affairs at the University of Tennessee; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Why Food Security Matters,” <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/031418_Castellaw_Testimony.pdf>]

Food Security Is Critical to Our National Security

The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be nuanced and comprehensive, employing “hard” as well as “soft” power in a National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power, including a Food Security Strategy.

An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings.

These conclusions are based on my decades of experience while serving as a Marine around the world and from a lifetime as a steward of the soil on my family farm in Tennessee. I see food security strategy in military terms as either being “defensive” or “offensive”. “Defensive” includes those actions we take to protect our agricultural infrastructure including crops, livestock and the food chain here in the United States. Conversely, the “Offensive” side of food security takes the initiative to deal with food security issues overseas and this is where I will spend most of my time today.

There is a good reason for our success on the “defensive” here at home in ensuring our own food security. As my good friend and former Tennessee Deputy Agriculture Commissioner Louis Buck points out to me, American agriculture has always been about public/private enterprise. The Morrill Act of 1862 – showing our Country’s foresight and confidence in the future even in the dark days of our Civil War – created our Land Grant University model of teaching, research and extension. And equally importantly, we have a private sector that values individual initiative, unleashing an unparalleled vitality. With that vitality driving innovation, our farmers and ranchers leverage the expertise and information from the public sector to manage risks and seek profits from deployed capital. But above all, American farmers and ranchers are our “citizen soldiers” on the front lines here at home fighting to guarantee our food security.

America is also blessed with fertile soil, water availability, moderate climate, and the advanced technology to successfully utilize our abundance. Whether I walk the corn fields of Indiana or the cotton fields of Tennessee, I see agricultural technology in use that is amazing. Soon after I retired from the Marines and came home to the family farm, I climbed into the cab of a self-propelled sprayer. Settling into the seat was like strapping into the cockpit of one of the aircraft I flew, except the sprayer had more computing power and better data links. All these factors, public and private, natural and manmade, hard work and innovation, combine to provide the American people with the widest choices in the world of wholesome foods to eat and clothes to wear.

## Off

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#### Robust economic recovery now---multiple indicators.

Lane ’10/20 [Sylvan; October 20, 2021; The Hill, “Labor shortage, inflation pose political obstacles for Biden,” https://thehill.com/policy/finance/577492-labor-shortage-inflation-pose-political-obstacles-for-biden]

Economists expected labor force participation to jump up notably over the summer and early autumn as vaccination rates improved, federal jobless aid programs expired and schools reopened for full-time in-person learning. More than 10 million jobs remained unfilled in August, and the high demand for workers has pushed wages 0.6 percent higher since September.

Even so, the emergence of the delta variant in late July, a month when the U.S. added more than 1 million jobs, upended that progress. The U.S. added just 366,000 jobs in August and 194,000 in September as the labor force participation rate also stalled out at 61.6 percent, 1.7 percent below its pre-pandemic level.

“The whole economy was set up for a huge fraction of our employment to be in services, and within two years we’ve had this massive shift that hasn’t unwound yet, said Claudia Sahm, senior fellow at the Jain Family Institute and former Federal Reserve research director.

“We have a very uneven movement back to normal and it’s taking some time to work it out.”

At the same time, consumers shifted their spending from the recovering services sector to already booming goods producers, but with far more money to spend than in earlier days of the pandemic. Retail sales rose 0.7 percent in September after jumping 0.8 percent in August, led by 5.7 percent increase in sales by retailers without physical locations.

Sahm, like other left-leaning economists and Biden administration officials, highlighted the sharp rise in wages, intense demand for workers and rising corporate earnings as a stark contrast to the sluggish recovery from the 2008 recession. Biden himself has also touted a steep decline in jobless claims and steady growth in retail sales as proof of progress under his watch.

“The signs are clear that, despite the global challenges caused by the delta variant, our economy is on the right track,” Biden said in a Friday statement, crediting his recent vaccine mandate push for some of the improvement.

And even some right-leaning economists agree that the quicker rebound from the pandemic-driven recession is far better for the economy than the languid recovery from 2008, even with higher inflation.

“Frankly, I’m much happier having these sorts of problems than the really slow recovery of the 2010s,” said Alan Cole, former chief economist for Republicans on the Joint Economic Committee. “Even when we are complaining about slower months, the slow months are usually followed by faster months, and even the slow ones are faster than the pace of the 2010s.”

But the uneven pace of the recovery, along with a stimulus-fueled return to pre-vaccination spending habits, has kept up pressure on inflation and overloaded supply lines as headline job growth stalls.

“Elevated goods spending is just delaying the reallocation of the economy to where it needs to go,” said Adam Ozimek, chief economist at Upwork.

“Service-providing companies can expand employment to get back to their prior capacity levels,” he continued.

“Goods-providing companies are not really going to expand and invest because they understand that this is temporary. No one’s out there building lots of brand new bicycle factories because they think we’re in a new era of bicycle demand. They understand that this is pandemic related.”

#### But the plan derails it.

Rybnicek ’21 [Jan; Feb 12; Counsel in the antitrust practice of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer and a Senior Fellow at the Global Antitrust Institute at Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, CNBC, “Op-ed: Recent antitrust proposals could ‘throw sand in the gears’ of economic recovery by stalling M&A,” https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/12/op-ed-recent-antitrust-proposals-add-friction-to-ma-at-wrong-time.html]

While these proposals are well-intentioned, they threaten to throw sand in the gears of the economy and to do far more harm than good. Adding friction to M&A activity has the potential to stall capital markets, reduce innovation and investment, and frustrate economic growth. And it does so at precisely the wrong time — when the nation is attempting an economic recovery during an ongoing global pandemic that has upended how we work.

Antitrust has seized lawmakers’ interest like no other time in modern memory. Senator Klobuchar’s legislation is the most ambitious attempt to reform the antitrust laws in nearly half a century. A key focus of the bill is to make it even easier for the federal antitrust authorities — the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) — to intervene in private parties’ dealings by blocking M&A that they decide will harm competition.

Under existing law, the antitrust agencies must convince a judge that a deal is likely to substantially lessen competition in order to obtain an injunction preventing the transaction. The agencies bear the burden in proving their case. That typically has not been too tall an order. While reviewing a government challenge to a small grocery store merger and lamenting the internal contradictions in antitrust law, Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once observed that the only thing consistent about merger litigation is that the government always wins.

Over the last several decades, antitrust has become a more principled body of law through the incorporation of economics and a focus on promoting consumer welfare, but one thing has not changed: the government still nearly always wins.

Reform advocates would have you believe that the FTC and DOJ show up in court on a wing and a prayer and rarely are able to convert the power and credibility of the federal government into merger litigation victories. But reality is far different. The government has no problem blocking mergers it believes are problematic. Over the last 20 years the DOJ and FTC have prevailed in nearly 85% of merger challenges. That is a record any litigator would envy. And the government’s win-rate only improves when looking at more recent cases. In fact, after the DOJ or FTC challenge a merger, companies more often than not abandon their deal before trial because the legal standard is so favorable to the government. This even includes successful challenges against deals involving the acquisition of a nascent firm that does not compete against the acquirer today but, in the government’s view, could in the future, such as the DOJ’s recent success in blocking Visa’s purchase of fintech upstart Plaid.

Senator Klobuchar’s legislation would put the thumb on the scale even more in favor of the government. It would lower the legal standard and allow the government to stop any deal that raises even an “appreciable risk of materially lessening competition.” It also would create presumptions against large deals that do not even involve competitors. Most significantly, the legislation flips the traditional burdens of proof on their head and requires defendants to prove that their deal should be allowed to close. In light of the disadvantages companies already face when confronted with government opposition, such changes are unwarranted, unless you believe the government is infallible and should win 100% of its cases.

Giving the government greater discretion to intervene in deals would add unnecessary friction to the M&A market and reduce the types of investments that have fueled U.S. economic growth, including in the many startups whose founders and investors develop new and innovative products in part due to the prospect of exit through M&A.

#### Extinction---recovery caps numerous geopolitical crises.

Baird ’20 [Zoe; October 2020; C.E.O. and President of the Markle Foundation, Member of the Aspen Strategy Group and former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations, J.D. and A.B. from the University of California at Berkeley; Domestic and International (Dis)order: A Strategic Response, “Equitable Economic Recovery is a National Security Imperative,” Ch. 13]

A strong and inclusive economy is essential for American national security and global leadership. As the nation seeks to return from a historic economic crisis, the national security community should support an equitable recovery that helps every worker adapt to the seismic shifts underway in our economy.

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a bedrock of America’s economic and political strength—both domestically and in the international arena. A strong and equitable recovery from the economic crisis created by COVID-19 would be a powerful testament to the resilience of the American system and its ability to create prosperity at a time of seismic change and persistent global crisis. Such a recovery could attack the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without bold action to help all workers access good jobs as the economy returns, the United States risks undermining the legitimacy of its institutions and its international standing. The outcome will be a key determinant of America’s national security for years to come.

An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a bachelor’s degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits, and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market.

To achieve these goals, American policy makers need to establish job growth strategies that address urgent public needs through major programs in green energy, infrastructure, and health. Alongside these job growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers’ needs and develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of international cooperation and international engagement.

Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset

A strong economy is essential to America’s security and diplomatic strategy. Economic strength increases our influence on the global stage, expands markets, and funds a strong and agile military and national defense. Yet it is not enough for America’s economy to be strong for some—prosperity must be broadly shared. Widespread belief in the ability of the American economic system to create economic security and mobility for all—the American Dream— creates credibility and legitimacy for America’s values, governance, and alliances around the world.

After World War II, the United States grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement made America the model of the free world—setting the stage for decades of American political and economic leadership. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is core to the legitimacy of our democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important part of creating trust in a democratic government’s ability to meet the needs of the people.

The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk

For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement.

Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America’s most economically vulnerable workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor’s degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3

The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover earnings and income than White workers.4

The Case for an Inclusive Recovery

A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will strengthen American moral and political authority around the world. It will send a strong message about the strength and resilience of democratic government and the American people’s ability to adapt to a changing global economic landscape. An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to NATO’s ability to solve shared geopolitical and security challenges. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a position of economic strength will enable us to address global crises such as climate change, global pandemics, and refugees. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity.

The U.S. has unique advantages that give it the tools to emerge from the crisis with tremendous economic strength— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.

## Off

Politics DA:

#### Biden PC gets BBB back on track.

Nichols ’1/2 [Hans; 1/2/22; writer for Axios News; "Scoop: Manchin returns to Build Back Better negotiations with demands," https://www.axios.com/scoop-manchin-new-play-2cb59ff0-1577-44bf-81a4-a0d72b7e9be2.html]

Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) is open to reengaging on the climate and child care provisions in President Biden's Build Back Better agenda if the White House removes the enhanced child tax credit from the $1.75 trillion package — or dramatically lowers the income caps for eligible families, people familiar with the matter tell Axios.

Why it matters: The holdback senator's engagement on specifics indicates negotiations between him and the White House could get back on track, even after Manchin declared he was a “no” on the package on Dec. 19.

The senator’s concerns with the size and the scope of the package remain.

His belief that it could cost more than $4 trillion over 10 years extends beyond the CTC issue, and he continues to tell colleagues he’s concerned about the inflationary effects of so much government spending, Axios is told.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics will release its next Consumer Price Index on Jan. 12. Last month's reading put inflation at 6.8% for the year — fueling Manchin's opposition.

The big picture: Manchin and top White House aides traded recriminations after their negotiations fell apart — but President Biden and the senator subsequently spoke by phone late in the evening of Dec. 19.

They agreed to continue to talk, and Manchin stayed in touch with senior White House officials over the holidays.

The week before Christmas, reports emerged about how close he and Biden were on a potential deal.

The details included a $1.8 trillion offer from Manchin that contained money for universal preschool and green tax credits but nothing for the child tax credit, which provides families up to $3,600 per child per year.

Families who make up to $400,000 had been receiving some CTC payments under the program that ended Jan. 1.

Between the lines: One possible solution to the stalemate would be to remove the CTC from the Build Back Better legislation, which the Senate plans to pass with only Democratic votes.

The chamber could then have a separate, focused debate during a midterm year about making the tax credits permanent.

Some Republicans, like Sen. Mitt Romney (R-Utah), are supportive of the CTC, but it’s unclear if Democrats could find all 10 Republicans needed to clear the 60-vote threshold for passing major legislation.

#### Antitrust requires PC. Knocks out competing domestic initiatives.

Carstensen ’21 [Peter; February 2021; Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin Law School; Concurrences, “The ‘Ought’ and ‘Is Likely’ of Biden Antitrust,” <https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2021/on-topic/the-new-us-antitrust-administration-en#carstensen>]

14. Similarly, despite bipartisan murmurs about competitive issues, the potential in a closely divided Congress that any major initiatives will survive is limited at best. In part the challenge here is how the Biden administration will rank its commitments. If it were to make reform of competition law a major and primary commitment, it would have to trade off other goals, which might include health care reform or increases in the minimum wage. It is likely in this circumstance the new administration, like the Obama administration’s abandonment of the pro-competitive rules proposed under the PSA, would elect to give up stricter competition rules in order to achieve other legislative priorities.

15. Another key to a robust commitment to workable competition is the choice of cabinet and other key administrative positions. Here as well, the early signs are not entirely encouraging. In selecting Tom Vilsack to return as secretary of agriculture, the president has embraced a friend of the large corporate interests dominating agriculture who has spent the last four years in a highly lucrative position advancing their interests. Given the desperate need for pro-competitive rules to implement the PSA and control exploitation of dairy farmers through milk-market orders, the return of Vilsack is not good news. Who will head the FTC and who will be the attorney general and assistant attorney general for antitrust is still unknown, but if those picks are also centrists with strong links to corporate America the hope for robust enforcement of competition law will further attenuate!

16. In sum, this is a pessimistic prognostication for the likely Biden antitrust enforcement agenda. There is much that ought to be done. But this requires a willingness to take major enforcement risks, to invest significant political capital in the legislative process, and to select leaders who are committed to advancing the public interest in fair, efficient and dynamically competitive markets. The early signs are that the new administration will be no more committed to robust competition policy than the Obama administration. Events may force a more vigorous policy—I will cling to that hope as the Biden administration takes shape.

#### Prevents existential climate disaster.

Moncrief ’21 [Aliki; 11/11/21; executive director of Florida Conservation Voters; Orlando Sentinel, “Build Back Better Act would help in climate crisis,” https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/guest-commentary/os-op-climate-change-congress-act-now-20211111-44u6bgyn5fdvnp3eqievkebqpe-story.html]

Last week, Congress passed the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. This bipartisan bill will address upgrades to things like our transportation system, rural broadband, public transit, and clean-water infrastructure. These are badly needed, overdue investments that will make our communities more resilient to the climate impacts we are already seeing. But we know much more is needed.

It’s not enough to just respond to extreme weather — we need to cut the pollution driving it in the first place. That’s why Congress must also pass the Build Back Better Act, the most transformational climate and jobs legislation in our nation’s history. By investing in clean energy and things like electric vehicles and more energy-efficient homes and businesses, we can stop making the problem worse and avoid a growing disaster. We don’t have time for half measures, and Floridians know it — more than 75% of registered voters in the state support bold congressional action on climate change.

The Build Back Better Act takes bold steps to dramatically reduce climate pollution for everyone. But it also centers those who have been disproportionately impacted by this crisis by taking steps to address the decades of unchecked environmental injustice, ensuring at least 40% of the benefits of this bill go to those communities hardest hit by pollution and climate change.

Building a clean energy economy is an investment that will pay dividends for families today and for generations to come. Preventing the most catastrophic hurricanes, floods and heat waves will help ensure that we still bring people from all over the world to our beaches, the Everglades, and every amazing destination across our state that supports our multi-billion dollar tourism industry.

And the robust clean-energy investments in the Build Back Better Act will create millions of good-paying jobs for Floridians in every corner of our state. Florida already ranks fourth in the nation for clean-energy employment, and this legislation would help this industry grow exponentially by tapping into the Sunshine State’s solar power potential.

Orlando has some great members of Congress who understand that climate change is an existential threat to our state and they ran on being a part of the solution to this crisis. Now, we are counting on them to take bold action and pass the Build Back Better Act. This is a win-win-win that creates jobs, lowers energy bills for Floridians, and begins to address the climate crisis at the same time.

## OFF

Adv cp

#### The United States federal government should:

#### require agencies to prosecute serial criminality by domestic financial institutions as financial crimes and update the Sentencing Guidelines to require courts to dissolve companies that are found guilty of those crimes.

#### substantially increase funding for research and development in technologies and technological infrastructure and provide funding for human capital development and research institutions in innovative industries, including incentives for reshoring manufacturing

#### pass the Artificial Intelligence Development Act, creating an agency tasked with certifying the safety of AI systems and a liability system under which the designers, manufacturers, and sellers of AI programs would be subject to limited tort liability.

#### Their only solvency advocate for the first advantage is about changing sentencing guidelines for financial crimes prosecutions by the DOJ and SEC – the CP solves that---Michigan Reads Blue

**Slawotsky 15** (Joel Slawotsky – lecturer in several law and business schools, including IDC Radzyncr Law School (Herzilya, Israel); Academic Center for Law and Business (Ramat Gan, Israel); Colman Business School MBA program; and the Haim Striks Law School (Rishon L'Tzion, Israel), AV peer review rated attorney and former law clerk to the Honorable Charles H. Tenney (United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York) and litigator at Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal (now Dentons) representing clients in state and federal courts at both the trial and appellate level. <KEN> “Reining in Recidivist Financial Institutions,” *Delaware Journal of Corporate Law*. Vol. 40. <https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/decor40&div=8&id=&page=>) \*brackets in original

IV. THE NEED TO UTILIZE THE "ALMOST" ULTIMATE SANCTION

The existing remedy for illegal conduct perpetrated by financial institutions is woefully ineffective. The practice, wherein financial institutions systemically violate the law and the resulting profits dwarf [swamp] the imposed penalties, has bred disenfranchisement and disdain among the American public.'1 " Large corporate profiteers and the racketeers themselves-managers, executives, and directors-bear little or no risk of meaningful criminal prosecution or imprisonment." 5 Moreover, prosecutors are averse to criminally pursuing large financial institutions." 6 Their hesitation is motivated by concerns for large-scale economic consequences:

The government has been reluctant to bring criminal charges against large corporations, fearing that such an action could imperil a company and throw innocent employees out of work. Those fears trace to the indictment of Enron's accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, which went out of businesses after its 2002 conviction, taking 28,000 jobs with it. Ever since, prosecutors have increasingly relied on deferred-prosecution agreements, which rebuke companies without threatening their health.

While the prosecutors are averse, the schemes continue and the criminal conduct enriches the financial institutions." 8 The public correctly perceives that the TBTF and TBTJ financial institutions have no meaningful incentive to change and will continue to scheme." 9 The current regime of regulation and penalty assessment is outmoded and unsustainable. What should be the response to rampant corrupt behavior?

Corporations, as juridical organizations, can be prosecuted4 50 and subject to an array of sanctions, such as fines and disgorgement of profits.451 For corporations whose main goal is to engage in criminal acts, the law provides for the "execution" of the business.4 52 Many call for prosecutors to become more aggressive and for regulators to cease waiving penalties.453 Yet, as outlined above, 5 " prosecutors and regulators have great personal incentive to not overly punish a financial institution. Thus, demands for more aggressive prosecutorial action may not prove substantially beneficial.

So what is the alternative? Under what circumstances is ordinary fine imposition inadequate? The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines") provide a useful perspective.455 Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, certain acts of outrageous misconduct justify a departure from the ordinary guidelines and call for punishment that exceeds the norm. 56 Among the types of actors that warrant extraordinary punishment are (1) actors that endanger national security,4 57 (2) serial criminals,458 and (3) actors that threaten financial markets.4 59 Accordingly, misconduct that impinges on the national security of the United States, is perpetrated by repeat offenders, or imperils the stability of financial markets should be treated differently.

Financial institutional misconduct closely tracks these types of outrageous misconduct. There is a match between the categories listed in the Sentencing Guidelines and a substantial amount of financial institutional wrongdoing.460 The institutional misconduct has enabled sanctions avoidance, terrorist enterprises, failed states, looting of national wealth, noncompliance with U.S. tax laws, LIBOR rate rigging, mortgage fraud, market manipulation, and may have proximately caused-or at the very least contributed to-the severe global financial crisis.461 Thus, to a large extent, the misconduct imperils the national security of the United States and threatens American financial markets. 62 Moreover, many of the institutions are repeat offenders, making them serial criminals. 63 In a stunning display of serial criminality, financial institutions have violated agreements with U.S. prosecutors; for example, Barclays-the bank that former CEO Jenkins promised had changed its ways-was caught violating an agreement with the U.S. Justice Department.4 6 In another example, UBS was caught violating its agreement, and the U.S. Justice Department is scheduled to nullify the settlement:

The U.S. Justice Department is set to rip up its agreement not to prosecute UBS Group AG for rigging benchmark interest rates, according to a person familiar with the matter, taking a new step to hold banks accountable for repeat offenses.

The move by the U.S. would be a first for the industry, making good on a March threat by a senior Justice Department official to revoke such agreements and putting banks on notice that these accords can be unwound if 465 misconduct continues.

In sum, the misconduct of many financial institutions mirrors the list in the Sentencing Guidelines for defendants whose actions deserve 466 extraordinary punishment.

Financial institutions will not have an incentive to act legally unless they risk losing their right to profit or risk having senior managers, officers, or directors imprisoned. 467 As long as these punishments are off the table, there is precious little incentive to rein in misconduct.468 By allowing the culprits to remain in business, the incentive to cease criminal activity is low:

Perhaps the most interesting part of the prolonged and leak-filled dance leading up to the expected criminal charges has been the effort to assure that the banks will stay in business after they plead guilty. Credit Suisse is expected to admit that it helped Americans evade taxes, and BNP Paribas is expected to admit that it did business with countries blacklisted by the United States. Regulators will not enforce statutes that would seem to bar the banks from some activities.

To put it another way, the Justice Department has gone to great lengths to guarantee that convicted banks will not be treated as criminals.

In being treated that way, the banks will receive the same breaks other banks have come to expect when they are caught violating rules or laws.469

Financial institutions must be more adequately punished to create a strong enough disincentive to break the law. However, liquidating the financial institution would risk engendering another Enron. A middle approach may be effective.

Financial institutions that commit certain misconduct within a certain time parameter should be sold off to their business rivals. 4 70 The U.S. Congress should pass legislation that mandates federal courts to dissolve a financial institution whose misconduct falls within the three categories listed in the Sentencing Guidelines.4 7 1 These corporations should be broken up and sold to business competitors.472 Additionally, their managers and directors should be banned from employment with any successor entity.473 Convictions, including guilty pleas, would count as violations. 474 Three violations committed within a ten-year time frame should trigger the penalty. 47 5

This punishment would accomplish several goals. First, the punishment will serve as a clear deterrent from engaging in such behavior.4 76 Second, it would remove the senior managers and officers from positions of authority in the successor company hopefully preventing repeat abuse.4 77 Third, it would stop the culture of fraud and flouting of the law in the company as it is absorbed by another entity. 4 7 8 Fourth, it would likely impede the executives from finding employment in the entire sector as other financial institutions would be loath to hire individuals responsible for the "almost" ultimate sanction. 479 Fifth, it would cause the managers and officers to lose their jobs, which will affect them personally. 480 Sixth, it will potentially reduce the losses to be borne by the shareholders for future misconduct.481 Seventh, it will reduce the discretionary waivers that prosecutors and regulators can award because of their self-interest in future employment.482 A federal judge will likely not be subject to the same enticement and lure of future employment with financial institutions.483

[Trinity’s evidence ends]

What about the possible negative outcomes? First, senior managers and officers who wish to engage in criminal conduct for a large profit will not be deterred. There exists a potential for such large profits to be created and short-term bonuses awarded, that even severe punishment would not deter every individual. In other words, financial institutions will continue to some extent to engage in criminal behavior. But it should reduce the frequency of criminal conduct because some who would have engaged in the same will be deterred. Second, liability exposure is a latent risk that requires due diligence.4 84 By being sold to competitors, an entity becomes a successor and may be liable for the predecessor's hidden misdeeds, which may reduce the price the acquiring entity is willing to pay, thus reducing value to shareholders.8 Third, illegal conduct may potentially be not prosecuted at all as prosecutorial discretion empowers the government to simply choose not to prosecute.486 Fourth, settlement of prosecutions with a guilty plea may be discouraged since under the proposal a settlement and guilty plea is counted as a conviction resulting in possible defense verdicts or dismissals.487

Notwithstanding the potential drawbacks, the benefits to this proposal are tangible. The dangers inherent in corporate prosecution will be reduced because the corporation will continue to exist, albeit in a different form. 488 This proposal will minimize or possibly eliminate the potential economic dislocation arising from the elimination of a 489 ~ lk business. Markets like certainty, and the knowledge that the entity will continue to exist should assuage concerns of unknown outcomes. 490 There will be no bankruptcies or interruptions for customers, and the business departments will simply be operated by competitors. 4 9 1 This proposal would also substantially lessen the risk that an indictment will lead to unemployment and economic hardship, since clients and other stakeholders know the financial institution will simply be broken up.4 92 This phenomenon is fairly common, given the last decade, which has included two merger waves where banks changed names with no effect on customer accounts.493 While there is no foolproof method to totally eliminate the risks, the current mode of punishment is broken, and continuing business as usual contains its own substantial risks. 494 The marketplace should take care of the managers responsible, as other entities will be reluctant to hire the people responsible for the financial institution's downfall.495 Such a punishment will act as a deterrent because the competitor who takes over the company will have every incentive to file suit against the officers responsible.496

If a rogue employee caused the misconduct despite the presence of adequate compliance controls, then such extraordinary punishment is not warranted.49 7 Corporate ratification of the wrongdoing should be required to trigger this punishment. 49 8 Such ratification could occur when misconduct is approved, directed, or taken with the knowledge of senior managers and directors. 49 9 The punishment would also not apply to mere negligence or even gross negligence.50 The misconduct would need to be similar to conduct needed for the imposition of punitive damages-reckless or intentional.50 These concerns are alleviated because a guilty plea or conviction would be unlikely unless the misconduct was ratified or endorsed by senior management. 502 If, for example, someone deceives a bank into violating sanctions, then there would not be any qualifying conduct.

This article outlined serious problems with the current regulatory and prosecutorial architecture and concluded that the current system is ineffective. This proposal aims to substantially reduce these reasons and impose a harsher risk for engaging in criminal activity.50 3 The consequences must be serious enough that such activity is considered too problematic. 5 04 The proposal described above attempts to balance various interests, such as preventing a financial institutional meltdown, allowing reasonable risk-taking, and preventing endemic illegal conduct.os Understandably, there are no guarantees with this proposal. The most substantial criticism is. that the wrongdoers will reap such a high benefit that it is worthwhile to engage in the conduct.506 However, merely continuing with business as usual almost guarantees future wrongdoing.507 "It's time to stop recidivism in financial crimes and to end the 'slap on the wrist' culture that exists at the Justice Department and the SEC."so

#### That solves the aff and avoid antitrust DAs---CP’s more predictable and enforceable

Shelanski 18 [Howard Shelanski, Professor of Law, Georgetown University; Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, “COMMENT: Antitrust and Deregulation,” 127 Yale L.J. 1922, 1926-1960, May, 2018, lexis]

Antitrust is not, however, the only institution through which government addresses competition concerns and market failures. Congress can give regulatory agencies authority to intervene where they see the need to address competition and market structure--and Congress has often done so. With such statutory authority, "[i]n effect, the agency becomes a limited-jurisdiction enforcer of antitrust principles." 16 For example, the Department of Transportation (DOT) has jurisdiction to approve transfers of routes between airlines carriers, giving it a role in reviewing airline mergers. 17 The 1992 Cable Act gave the FCC authority [\*1927] to limit the share of the national cable market that a single operator could serve, thereby giving the agency some control over the industry's market structure. 18 The FCC has long regulated market entry and, through its control over license transfers, reviewed mergers and acquisitions in several sectors of the telecommunications industry. More recently, the FCC issued, 19 and then repealed, 20 "network neutrality" regulations intended to preserve ease of entry and a level playing field for digital services. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of Energy, and numerous other federal agencies have various powers that directly affect competition. 21 State regulation can be important as well in governing competition, particularly in the insurance and healthcare industries. 22

In contrast to the case-by-case approach of antitrust, regulation typically imposes ex ante prohibitions or requirements on business conduct. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example, required incumbent local telephone companies to grant new competitors access to parts of their networks and prohibited incumbents from refusing to interconnect calls from their customers to customers of competing networks. 23 With the rule in place, the FCC bore no burden of proving that a specific instance of network access was necessary for competition, or that a specific denial of interconnection would harm competition. In contrast [\*1928] to antitrust, where the burden of proving liability is on the agency, under a regulatory regime the burden of seeking a waiver from regulation or challenging an agency's enforcement decision is usually on the regulated party.

Antitrust and regulation therefore present alternative approaches to governing competition and addressing market failures. 24 The government can review individual mergers under the antitrust laws, as it does in most markets, or it can set rules that impose clear, ex ante limits on the extent of concentration, as the FCC did for media ownership under the Communications Act. 25 Government can investigate under the antitrust laws whether a firm has monopoly power that it has "willful[ly]" acquired or maintained other than "as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 26 Alternatively, with authority from Congress an agency can regulate how much of a market a single firm can serve, as the FCC tried to do with cable companies, 27 or require firms to dispose of key assets in order to promote competition in a relevant market, as the DOT has done with airline slots. 28

#### Federally funded R&D is the crux of innovation that solves all of their impacts

Andes 16 (Scott Andes is a former fellow with the Bass Initiative on Innovation and Placemaking. “Maximizing the local economic impact of federal R&D” 10/26/16, https://www.brookings.edu/research/maximizing-the-local-economic-impact-of-federal-rd)

Federally funded research and development (R&D) is a hallmark of the U.S. economy. Two-thirds of the most influential technologies of the past 50 years were supported by federal R&D at national laboratories and universities.1 Smartphones, autonomous vehicles, personalized medicine, and other transformational innovations owe key technical components to public R&D. Moreover, this federal commitment does more than produce new products. By fostering innovation, it translates into productivity growth, the most important mechanism for ensuring economic growth and broadly shared prosperity. Most federal R&D does not happen in Washington, but these investments “come to ground” in communities across the country, and these regions should share in the economic benefits of research. To maximize and make apparent the economic returns from R&D, the Trump administration should seek to improve the local economic impact of federal R&D. Editor's Note: The following brief is part of Brookings Big Ideas for America—an institution-wide initiative in which Brookings scholars have identified the biggest issues facing the country and provide ideas for how to address them. (Updated February 2, 2017) Buy the book- Brookings Big Ideas for AmericaDespite the critical nature of scientific discovery, federal R&D is under siege. As a share of GDP it is less than half what it was in the mid-1960s,[2] and, while the United States once led the world in government-funded R&D intensity, we now rank 12th.[3] Even at historically low levels, current federal R&D may face greater cuts in the future. As mounting debt and mandatory spending squeeze discretionary spending across the federal budget, federal R&D is likely to come under increased scrutiny. According to Congressional Budget Office projections, discretionary spending will shrink from one-third of the federal budget to 22 percent by 2026.[4] Federal expenditures on R&D as a percent of GDP, 1953-2016 Chart Showing U.S. Federal expenditures on R&D as a percent of GDP, 1953-2016 Source: National Science Foundation, 2016. In the middle of the 20th century, members of Congress and the voters who elected them saw federal R&D as a necessary condition for achieving important national objectives like space exploration, disease eradication, and addressing looming energy crises. Today, for many Americans, these missions have taken a back seat to the growing demand for high economic returns-on-investment. State legislators, mayors, governors, and members of Congress rally when the possibility of a military base closure threatens jobs, but they are silent or perhaps clueless when cuts in research funds for the national laboratories and universities within their jurisdiction undermine regional innovation, jobs, and growth. To maximize and make apparent the economic returns from R&D, the next administration should seek to improve the local economic impact of federal R&D. In the United States and around the world, scientific and R&D-intensive firms situate themselves in proximity to universities and national laboratories to enjoy myriad “ecosystem” benefits. Local economic clusters, often anchored by cities and urbanized research parks, emerge to concentrate knowledge flows, specialized workers, and supply chains in a way that encourages innovation and leads to higher productivity.[5] The next administration should direct the largest federal R&D funding agencies—the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the Department of Energy (DOE)—to adopt policies to better support local economic development. Not only do these departments represent the majority of federal investments in R&D, but they also have unique investment vehicles that can be leveraged by cities at different points in the development process and through different mechanisms. DOD, through its own efforts and those that flow from partnerships and procurement, consumes technology to meet its mission objectives. No other federal agency has such a quasifiduciary relationship with the commercial outcomes of its own R&D funding, and DOD can better solve battlefield challenges by taking greater advantage of regional clusters of knowledge flows, specialized workers, and dense supply chains. In contrast to DOD, DHHS invests almost all its R&D funds externally through competitive grants distributed around the country. Its geographically diverse portfolio is ideally suited for blending regional economic development with its primary mission of improving health. DOE invests heavily in its 17 national laboratories around the country. Few are located in dense regional technology clusters and cities, but these labs could bring the frontiers of science to market more quickly by strategically locating and linking parts of their core competencies in the vicinity of large and small firms, venture capitalists, and other research institutions. In sum, each of these three agencies has unique potential to improve the economic return on investment of federal R&D by capitalizing on relationships with local economic clusters.

#### The counterplan’s AI agency leverages the strengths of both agencies and courts to create responsive AI policy without the need for broad deference

**Scherer 16** [Matthew U. Scherer, Attorney, Buchanan Angeli Altschul & Sullivan LLP, “REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS: RISKS, CHALLENGES, COMPETENCIES, AND STRATEGIES,” Spring, 2016, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 29 Harv. J. Law & Tec 353]

Part IV sets forth a proposed regulatory regime for AI. The purpose of this proposal is not to provide a complete blueprint for an AI regulatory regime, but rather to start a conversation on how best to manage the public risks associated with AI without stifling innovation. To that end, the scheme outlined below proposes legislation, the Artificial Intelligence Development Act ("AIDA"), that would create an agency tasked with certifying the safety of AI systems. Instead of giving the new agency FDA-like powers to ban products it believes to be unsafe, AIDA would create a liability system under which the designers, manufacturers, and sellers of agency-certified AI programs would be subject to limited tort liability, while uncertified programs that are offered for commercial sale or use would be subject to strict joint and several liability.

AIDA leverages the respective institutional strengths of legislatures, agencies, and courts, as discussed in Part III, while taking account of the unique aspects of AI research that make it particularly difficult to regulate, as discussed in Part II. It takes advantage of legislatures' democratic legitimacy by assigning legislators the task of setting forth the goals and purposes that guide AI regulation. It delegates the substantive task of assessing the safety of AI systems to an independent agency staffed by specialists, thus insulating decisions about the safety of specific AI systems from the pressures exerted by electoral politics. This critical task is assigned to agencies because those institutions are better equipped than courts to assess the safety of individual AI systems, largely due to the misaligned incentives of the court system. Decisions regarding the safety of an emerging technology should not be informed primarily by testimony from hired guns chosen by litigants, particularly because individual court cases rarely reflect the overall risks and benefits associated with any technology. n146 Finally, AIDA leverages courts' experience in adjudicating individual disputes by assigning courts the tasks of determining whether an AI system falls within the scope of an agency-certified design and allocating responsibility when the interaction between multiple components of an AI system give rise to tortious harm.

This strong tort-based system would compel designers and manufacturers to internalize the costs associated with AI-caused harm -- ensuring compensation for victims and forcing AI designers, programmers, and manufacturers to examine the safety of their systems -- without the innovation-stifling effects of an agency empowered to ban certain AI systems outright.

## OFF

T-per se

#### ‘Prohibiting’ a practice requires per se illegality.

Lee Mendelsohn 6, Director at Edward Nathan, “KIPA Conduct Amounts to Price Fixing”, Business Day (South Africa), 6/12/2006, Lexis

The first step in any competition law analysis is to define the relevant market. There are two components to an analysis of the relevant market, namely the relevant product market and the geographic market.

The relevant product market consists of those products and services that operate as a competitive constraint on the behaviour of the suppliers of those products and/or services.

The relevant product market is determined by ascertaining whether a small but significant non-transient increase in pricing of the product in question would cause buyers to substitute the product with another product or would cause suppliers of other products to begin producing the product in question.

The relevant geographic market is determined by ascertaining whether a small but significant non-transient increase in pricing of the product in question would cause buyers to purchase the product from other geographic areas, alternatively suppliers of the product in other geographic areas to supply those products into the area in question.

For the purposes of this case study, we are instructed to accept that each medical speciality constitutes a relevant product market and that the relevant geographic market for each of them is Kleindorpie.

The Competition Act provides that "an agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if … it involves … directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition".

An "agreement" is defined as including a contract, arrangement or understanding, whether or not legally enforceable. The term agreement is very widely defined. A "horizontal relationship" is defined as a "relationship between competitors".

The prohibition on the fixing of a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition is one of the so-called "per se" prohibitions which are included in our Competition Act. The prohibition is automatic and absolute and the fixing of prices or other trading condition cannot be justified on the basis of any technological, efficiency or other procompetitive gains that could outweigh the potential anticompetitive effect of the fixing of the price or trading condition. If the capitation plan of KIPA falls within the restrictive horizontal practice prohibiting price fixing and the fixing of other trading conditions, such practice will be a contravention of the act.

Limits---many standards, requiring distinct answers, make the topic unmanageable.

Ground---fringe standards dodge links and allow bidirectional permissiveness.

## To Big to Fail Adv

### 1nc: Squo solves

#### Squo solves ---Dodd Frank and sox both exist to criminalize corporate crimes and was created after Enron to solve the scandal

### 1nc: at Kleptocracy Impact

#### No impact to kleptocracy---it weakens governments and makes them unable to pursue their priorities globally---any instability is internal

Natalie Duffy 17, and Nate Sibley, both researchers at Hudson Institute’s Kleptocracy Initiative, 1/5/17, “Five myths about kleptocracy,” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-kleptocracy/2017/01/04/42b30d72-c78f-11e6-8bee-54e800ef2a63_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ffd5bed8a856>

MYTH NO. 2 Kleptocraciesare strong. Today, some of the most powerful countries in the world are kleptocracies. Russia, for example, currently seems to be dictating global affairs. China, another classic, is the second-largest economy in the world. Kleptocracy doesn’t necessarily make governments weak. But the skewed priorities of greedy autocratic rulers and the looting of resources that should be used for public services mean that the countries are much weaker than they should be. Russia, for instance, can’t afford to honor its obligations to impoverished pensioners , but there is apparently plenty of money available for Putin’s former judo partner to build a bridge to occupied Crimea and for a new Kremlin propaganda channel in France. A 2016 report showed that developing countries collectively had lost $16.3 trillion to illicit leakages since 1980. While their people struggled, starved and died, exported corruption effectively made these governments net creditors to the world economy. In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that people begin to see government as a criminal racket instead of a legitimate provider of public services. In extreme cases where elites have given up any pretense of government, this includes security: It is no coincidence that the world’s most corrupt countries are also the most internally divided and violent. In the long run, then, kleptocracy doesn’t just weaken governments. It destroys them.

#### Corruption isn’t destabilizing

LE BILLON 03 Phillipe, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia Journal of International Development J. Int. Dev. 15, 413–426 (2003) .

There is now a broad consensus on the deleterious impact of corruption on economic growth, equitable wealth distribution and the legitimacy and efficiency of governing institutions. As Theobald (1990, p. 130) summarizes, ‘the political ascendance of naked self-interest intensifies social inequalities, encourages social fragmentation and internecine conflict and propels a corrupt society into an unremitting cycle of institutional anarchy and violence’. This argument, however, does not go unchallenged. Such a view of corruption lacks historical and cultural contextualization, as the widely diverging experiences of relations between corruption, development and politics demonstrate in the recent history of Asian, African and Latin American countries (Johnston, 1986; Szeftel, 2000). Corruption is not systematically ‘naked self-interest’ but can respond, for example, to codes of reciprocity within (neo)patrimonial political systems based on legitimate patronage (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). More broadly, corruption is endogenous to many political structures in which it serves key hierarchical functions, thereby contributing to political order (Cohen et al., 1981; Charap and Harm, 1999). Although corruption has in itself a corrosive effect on economies and rule-based institutions, corruption is part of the fabric of social and political relationships. This endogenous character means that conflicts may arise more from changes in the pattern of corruption, than from corruption itself. Domestic or external shocks affecting the pattern of corruption may therefore contribute to conflict, particularly when corruption is pervasive. Such external shocks include the international delegitimization of authoritarian rule motivated in large part by the end of the cold war together with the enforcement of new international standards in public finance, democracy and ‘good governance’ which have, over the last decade, resulted in a decline in public rents and a readjustment towards the private sector. While some of the resulting conflicts have opened dialogue and promoted positive reforms in societies, others have degenerated into large-scale violence and even further illegitimate and predatory rule characterized by a shift from monopolistic forms of corruption to criminal and competitive ones.

### 1nc at: nuclear prolif

#### No prolif and no impact to it

**Mueller 17** (John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University & Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute & Senior Research Scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University "76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism" https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/cato-handbook-for-policymakers-8th-edition-76\_0.pdf)

Except for their effects on agonies, obsessions, rhetoric, posturing, and spending, the consequences of nuclear proliferation have been largely benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. For the most part, nuclear powers have found the weapons to be a notable waste of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have quietly kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. If the recent efforts to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons have been successful, those efforts have done Iran a favor. There has never been a militarily compelling reason to use nuclear weapons, particularly because it has not been possible to identify suitable targets—or targets that couldn’t be attacked as effectively by conventional munitions. Conceivably, conditions exist under which nuclear weapons could serve a deterrent function, but there is little reason to suspect that they have been necessary to deter war thus far, even during the Cold War. The main Cold War contestants have never believed that a repetition of World War II, whether embellished by nuclear weapons or not, is remotely in their interests. Moreover, the weapons have not proved to be crucial status symbols. How much more status would Japan have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal more attention to Britain or France if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or much less if they had none? Did China need nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth or its Olympics? Those considerations help explain why alarmists have been wrong for decades about the pace of nuclear proliferation. Most famously, in the 1960s, President John Kennedy anticipated that in another decade “fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons.” Yet, of the dozens of technologically capable countries that have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, very few have done so. Insofar as most leaders of most countries (even rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons, they have come to appreciate several drawbacks of doing so: nuclear weapons are dangerous, costly, and likely to rile the neighbors. Moreover, as the University of Southern California’s Jacques Hymans has demonstrated, the weapons have also been exceedingly difficult for administratively dysfunctional countries to obtain—it took decades for North Korea and Pakistan to do so. In consequence, alarmist predictions about proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points of no return have proved faulty. Although proliferation has so far had little consequence, that is not because the only countries to get nuclear weapons have had rational leaders. Large, important countries that acquired the bomb were run at the time by unchallenged—perhaps certifiably deranged—monsters. Consider Joseph Stalin, who, in 1949, was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong, who, in 1964, had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that resulted in an artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished. Some also fear that a country might use its nuclear weapons to “dominate” its area. That argument was used with dramatic urgency before 2003 when Saddam Hussein supposedly posed great danger, and it has been frequently applied to Iran. Exactly how that domination is to be carried out is never made clear. The notion, apparently, is this: should an atomic rogue state rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the area, suitably intimidated, would bow to its demands. Far more likely, threatened states would make common cause with each other and with other concerned countries (including nuclear ones) against the threatening neighbor. That is how countries coalesced into an alliance of convenience to oppose Iraq’s region-threatening invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yet another concern has been that the weapons will go off, by accident or miscalculation, devastating the planet in the process: the weapons exist in the thousands, sooner or later one or more of them will inevitably go off. But those prognostications have now failed to deliver for 70 years. That time period suggests something more than luck is operating. Moreover, the notion that if one nuclear weapon goes off in one place, the world will necessarily be plunged into thermonuclear cataclysm should remain in the domain of Hollywood scriptwriters.

### 1nc at: hegemony

#### No heg impact

**Fettweis ‘17** – Christopher J. Fettweis, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. [“Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” 5/8/2017, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394>] KS

Conflict and Hegemony by Region

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany's nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear.

Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions.

If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1.

These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.

In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington's intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a high-level US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day.

The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

Conflict and US Military Spending

How does one measure polarity? Power is traditionally considered to be some combination of military and economic strength, but despite scores of efforts, no widely accepted formula exists. Perhaps overall military spending might be thought of as a proxy for hard power capabilities; perhaps too the amount of money the United States devotes to hard power is a reflection of the strength of the unipole. When compared to conflict levels, however, there is no obvious correlation, and certainly not the kind of negative relationship between US spending and conflict that many hegemonic stability theorists would expect to see.

During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 percent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990.68 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.69 The world grew dramatically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces, however, and stayed just as peaceful while spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut under President Clinton, in other words, and kept declining (though more slowly, since levels were already low) as the Bush administration ramped it back up. Overall US military spending has varied during the period of the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy measurements for hegemony and conflict: there does not seem to be much connection between warfare and fluctuations in US GDP, alliance commitments, and forward military presence. There was very little fighting in Europe when there were 300,000 US troops stationed there, for example, and that has not changed as the number of Americans dwindled by 90 percent. Overall, there does not seem to be much correlation between US actions and systemic stability. Nothing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace.

### 1nc: at dollar heg

#### Dollar heg is inevitable

**Stokes 18** Doug Stokes, IR Prof @ the University of Exeter [Trump, American hegemony and the future of the liberal international order, International Affairs, 94(1)]//BPS

Structuring advantages within the liberal order As the protector of an open, integrated international market, the American state can claim special privileges to enable it to preserve the zone effectively, and there are a number of areas where being the system maker gives the US huge positional advantages. The first such area we should note here is its ‘dollar hegemony’, whereby the greenback acts as the world’s default global currency: this, most notably, allows it to run progressively larger current account deficits without having to worry about foreign exchange reserves. This makes the US Federal Reserve the world’s de facto central bank, giving it the luxury of unilaterally setting borrowing costs for the rest of the global economy. It is this form of dollar hegemony, and the ‘exorbitant privilege’ it affords the American state,28 that has helped inform a range of scholarship on American economic decline, especially in relation to a rising China and the potential internationalization of the renminbi and the associated challenge to US monetary regimes. According to this ‘declinist’ narrative, if the dollar loses its international reserve currency status other aspects of US hegemony, most notably its global military primacy, will begin to crumble as other currencies vie for international monetary leadership.29 In short, the ‘dollar’s reserve currency role is central to America’s geopolitical preeminence and if it loses that status US hegemony will be literally unaffordable’.30 However, not only does this ‘renminbi revisionism’ ignore the ways in which US military primacy in east Asia helps bolster its monetary power (see below); it is not borne out by the hard data. According to the most recently available data from the Bank of International Settlements in its 2016 triennial survey, the dollar accounted for 88 per cent of all over-the-counter trades in foreign exchange markets in 2016. The renminbi accounted for just 4 per cent.31 This is a huge disparity and hardly supports the idea of an imminent end to dollar hegemony. Dollar hegemony also has profound geopolitical implications. Specifically, the United States can fund its overseas military operations with freshly printed dollars largely at will. Between 2003 and 2008, for example, the ‘largest airborne transfer of currency in the history of the world’ saw the Federal Reserve print and ship US$40 billion in cash to Iraq to help finance the war. In just ‘the first two years, the shipments included more than 281 million individual bills weighing a total of 363 tons’.32 Dollar dominance has thus ensured that imports, debts and overseas military–political operations could all be paid for with greenbacks produced by the American state, which at the same time could gear its domestic macroeconomic management exclusively to conditions within the United States without any significant external constraint. More interestingly, dollar liquidity means that investors continue to use US monetary regimes even in the context of major global economic instability. For example, during the global financial crisis of 2008, not only did we not see a flight from US financial and monetary regimes, we actually saw the reverse: a global flight of capital into US debt markets, to the extent that in some instances US Treasury bonds had negative interest rates.33 In short, dollar hegemony and its privileges allow the US to externalize major crises through its unilateral capacity to alter its interest rates, to force other states to adjust accordingly, and to fund geopolitical hegemony on the cheap.

## Credit Suisse

### 1nc: at regulatory capture

#### Their impact card is a word salad highlighted to seem like an impact – the parts of the card with the “impacts” is a different unrelated section – and it says high tech monopolies and low corporate taxes are the cause of populist backlash, not regulatory capture – treat this impact as zero – Michigan reads blue

**Cerny 20** (Philip G. Cerny – Professor Emeritus of Politics and Global Affairs at the University of Manchester and Rutgers University-Newark. <KEN> “Afterword: The New Pessimism in Twenty-First-Century World Politics,” in “Pessimism in International Relations,” *Palgrave Studies in International Relations*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21780-8>)

This process leads to various consequences. First, different branches of the state, operating according to the particular issues they are allocated, are focused on their specifc endogenous policy problems, undermining the state’s capacity to produce effective overall policymaking strategies. As a consequence, diverse branches of the state increasingly develop special relationships with two sorts of regular interlocutors: the special interests that inhabit the private sectors with which they deal, and analogous public-sector interests too. This leads to what has been called ‘regulatory capture’, where the regulatory body is beholden to and absorbs the values and interests of the economic sectors they are charged with regulating in the public interest, often privileging private-sector interlocutors. This has also sometimes been called sectoral corporatism.

The second is that special relationships develop with disaggregated regulatory and policymaking bodies in (a) other states where interaction is frequent, and (b) particular branches of international institutions and regimes of supposedly global governance. Such regimes are increasingly disaggregated too, leading to ‘forum shopping’, where special interests look around for friendly branches of the regimes, a key element in what is called ‘regime complexity’.18 The third is that globalisation inherently leads to policy as well as social and political fragmentation.

The result is that the notion of an ‘international system’ composed of nation-states is increasingly unable to produce effective policies that promote public interests, the production of public goods and the provision of public services. In particular, the global fnancial crisis of 2008 produced not a comprehensive reform of the global or even national fnancial sectors but a process of bailing out that sector and, indeed, increasing its transnationalisation and oligopolisation.19 States are undermined by a range of interconnected, multilevel and multinodal structural trends. The result is what can be called a reactive state, in which a range of policymakers and regulatory bodies are embedded in regularised relationships between public and private sectors, where the latter are able to both set the agenda for policymaking and systematically avoid outcomes that restrict their activities, for example by shifting their activities across borders. I have elsewhere dubbed this process ‘transnational neopluralism’, referring to what is essentially plural elitism, which embeds what Lindblom terms ‘the privileged position of business’.20 This system goes well beyond economics, and is central to the rise of new pessimisms in the twenty-frst century.

As noted previously, the development of the nation-state system was inextricably intertwined with the frst two industrial revolutions, especially the Second Industrial Revolution. The First Industrial Revolution was at the root of British domestic political development, Britain’s dominance of the expansion of international trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the British Empire. The consolidation of largescale mass-production factories producing both primary, secondary and tertiary products, especially the second and third of these in the Second Industrial Revolution—what has been called Fordism—was at the core of industrialisation, expansion and national consolidation in the United States, Germany, Japan, to a lesser extent France, Russia and later the Soviet Union, and other nation-state empires at the heart of the nationstate system. Monopolisation, special interest corporatism and regulatory capture (in both directions) were all organised at the nation-state level and through national empire-building between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.

However, since the mid-twentieth century the world has seen the transformation of these economic structures with the digital and information technology revolutions, the growth of transnational monopolies and oligopolies, extensive interlinked supply chains, the almost complete transnationalisation of fnance capital, the ongoing development of artifcial intelligence and robotics, and so on—what has been called the ‘intangible economy’.21 Probably the best known example is the fnancial sector, where what has been called ‘fat money’ is created by states and private credit is created by banks, fnancial markets and the like, leading to a transnational ‘debt economy’ that replaces the productive economy of the frst two industrial revolutions.22

Relatedly, the high-tech sector,23 known colloquially as the FAANGs—Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netfix and Google—has recently been critiqued for its monopolistic practices and for its extensive and complex social impact on consumers and data.24 Not only is the world economy becoming more intersecting and interdependent, but the combination of technological transformation, consumerism, debt, increasing inequality and threats to employment, especially as older sectors languish, is widely thought to lead to ‘secular stagnation’ in the longer term.25 Indeed, as profts rise due to corporate tax cuts in the United States, debt is also rising as those profts are shifted into shareholder payouts, buybacks, mergers and acquisitions, rather than capital investment.26 These global economic processes are a major dimension of the rise of the New Pessimism, leading especially to what is known as the ‘populist backlash’ across the world.

The political sociology of the world is also changing. National identities are caught in the crossfre of revived and new identities based on ethnicity, race, religion, region—including cross-border regions— and attempts to mobilise a wide range of quasi-local, quasi-state and cross-border loyalties. This has been referred to as a new ‘tribalism’, with twenty-frst-century politics becoming increasingly about conficts between the ‘centralising elites’ of states and international organisations and new tribal affnities of many kinds that undermine both states and international organisations.27

What were once apparently consolidating nation-states with elites striving to construct Waltzian hierarchies and unit actors have become regional complexes—and are now seen to have always been that way— including the supposed international hegemon, the United States.28 It is unlikely that America can be made great again, as Father Charles Coughlin, the pro-Fascist mouthpiece of the America First movement in the 1930s and Donald Trump today would like. At least a new world war does not appear to be at hand, despite antagonisms between the United States and China and in other parts of the world.

International security is simply no longer about interstate wars and the massive deaths characteristic of the period from the decline of the Middle Ages to the twentieth century. It is about ongoing ethnic, religious, economic, cross-border and local conficts that are becoming more complex, embedded and endemic. The war in Afghanistan has been longer-lasting than any other war in the modern age, and involves multilevel relationships among the United States, Russia, several bordering states, and a range of complex and conficting internal players at the crossroads of south-central Asia.29 Patterns of violence are changing dramatically.30

In a different context in another key part of the world, the contemporary contentious politics in the United Kingdom and Europe over British exit from the European Union (Brexit) raise analogous issues of globalisation and fragmentation. A range of supranational and sub-national issue areas only beginning to take shape will dominate world politics in the future and will be increasingly diffcult to control and manage given the dislocations already mentioned. Probably the most signifcant of these is climate change. Another is the future of democracy itself in a world characterised by a combination of neoliberalism and Durkheimian anomie. 31 Whether the kind of optimisms (and pessimisms) that characterised earlier phases of nation-state-building can be reconstructed to suffciently control and manage the globalisation/fragmentation dialectic seems unlikely at this point in time.

Conclusion

All over the world, pessimism and populism are essentially backlashes against the diverse impacts, both material and psycho-sociological, of the erosion of the nation-state system and the lack, at this point at least, of viable alternatives in a globalising and fragmenting world.

Of course, there are optimists too, of whom the best known and most widely cited is probably Steven Pinker. In his well-documented book on war and international security, The Better Angels of Our Nature, Pinker demonstrates that international wars and deaths from war have dramatically declined since the middle of the twentieth century.32 However, he regards the reconsolidation of states as one of the key means necessary to continue this trend; furthermore the book was written before the full impact of ethnic, religious and civil wars, especially in Syria and the Middle East, had erupted to their current extent. Today, despite much lower death tolls overall in these very different kinds of wars, the impact of such conficts on strategic and tactical measures and, even more importantly, on media reporting and human consciousness, are perhaps even greater than in the world prior to the Vietnam War, when for the frst time war could be seen in the home on television on a daily basis. Pessimism is the natural reaction to such information spread.

In Enlightenment Now, Pinker makes the case for greater human progress in the coming century, with respect to life expectancy, health, wealth, inequality, the environment, peace, safety, terrorism, democracy, equal rights, knowledge, the quality of life, happiness and existential threats.33 Whether we are heading into such a world of greater progress, and therefore ought to be optimistic about the future of that world, does not match with wider perceptions of all of these issues. A revival of leadership or hegemony of leading nation-states is not only unlikely because of the reluctance of the United States and China to try to exercise it,34 but also because of the wider structural trends I have discussed here. Complexity rules in an unpredictable world of globalisation and fragmentation. The New Pessimism is predominant and, given the breadth and depth of the transformations described in this afterword, there seems to be more and more scope, whether in empirical reality, normative values, or perception for it to increase in the future. As the old saying goes, ‘only time will tell’.

### 1nc: at AI

#### AI Impact is wrong

Pinker 18(Stephen, professor of psychology at Harvard, “Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, EM)

Prominent among the existential risks that supposedly threaten the future of humanity is a 21st-century version of the Y2K bug. This is the danger that we will be subjugated, intentionally or accidentally, by artificial intelligence (AI), a disaster sometimes called the Robopocalypse and commonly illustrated with stills from the Terminator movies. As with Y2K, some smart people take it seriously. Elon Musk, whose company makes artificially intelligent self-driving cars, called the technology “more dangerous than nukes.” Stephen Hawking, speaking through his artificially intelligent synthesizer, warned that it could “spell the end of the human race.”19 But among the smart people who aren’t losing sleep are most experts in artificial intelligence and most experts in human intelligence. The Robopocalypse is based on a muzzy conception of intelligence that owes more to the Great Chain of Being and a Nietzschean will to power than to a modern scientific understanding.21 In this conception, intelligence is an all-powerful, wish-granting potion that agents possess in different amounts. Humans have more of it than animals, and an artificially intelligent computer or robot of the future (“an AI,” in the new count-noun usage) will have more of it than humans. Since we humans have used our moderate endowment to domesticate or exterminate less well-endowed animals (and since technologically advanced societies have enslaved or annihilated technologically primitive ones), it follows that a supersmart AI would do the same to us. Since an AI will think millions of times faster than we do, and use its superintelligence to recursively improve its superintelligence (a scenario sometimes called “foom,” after the comic-book sound effect), from the instant it is turned on we will be powerless to stop it.22 But the scenario makes about as much sense as the worry that since jet planes have surpassed the flying ability of eagles, someday they will swoop out of the sky and seize our cattle. The first fallacy is a confusion of intelligence with motivation—of beliefs with desires, inferences with goals, thinking with wanting. Even if we did invent superhumanly intelligent robots, why would they want to enslave their masters or take over the world? Intelligence is the ability to deploy novel means to attain a goal. But the goals are extraneous to the intelligence: being smart is not the same as wanting something. It just so happens that the intelligence in one system, Homo sapiens, is a product of Darwinian natural selection, an inherently competitive process. In the brains of that species, reasoning comes bundled (to varying degrees in different specimens) with goals such as dominating rivals and amassing resources. But it’s a mistake to confuse a circuit in the limbic brain of a certain species of primate with the very nature of intelligence. An artificially intelligent system that was designed rather than evolved could just as easily think like shmoos, the blobby altruists in Al Capp’s comic strip Li’l Abner, who deploy their considerable ingenuity to barbecue themselves for the benefit of human eaters. There is no law of complex systems that says that intelligent agents must turn into ruthless conquistadors. Indeed, we know of one highly advanced form of intelligence that evolved without this defect. They’re called women. The second fallacy is to think of intelligence as a boundless continuum of potency, a miraculous elixir with the power to solve any problem, attain any goal.23 The fallacy leads to nonsensical questions like when an AI will “exceed human-level intelligence,” and to the image of an ultimate “Artificial General Intelligence” (AGI) with God-like omniscience and omnipotence. Intelligence is a contraption of gadgets: software modules that acquire, or are programmed with, knowledge of how to pursue various goals in various domains.24 People are equipped to find food, win friends and influence people, charm prospective mates, bring up children, move around in the world, and pursue other human obsessions and pastimes. Computers may be programmed to take on some of these problems (like recognizing faces), not to bother with others (like charming mates), and to take on still other problems that humans can’t solve (like simulating the climate or sorting millions of accounting records). The problems are different, and the kinds of knowledge needed to solve them are different. Unlike Laplace’s demon, the mythical being that knows the location and momentum of every particle in the universe and feeds them into equations for physical laws to calculate the state of everything at any time in the future, a real-life knower has to acquire information about the messy world of objects and people by engaging with it one domain at a time. Understanding does not obey Moore’s Law: knowledge is acquired by formulating explanations and testing them against reality, not by running an algorithm faster and faster.25 Devouring the information on the Internet will not confer omniscience either: big data is still finite data, and the universe of knowledge is infinite. For these reasons, many AI researchers are annoyed by the latest round of hype (the perennial bane of AI) which has misled observers into thinking that Artificial General Intelligence is just around the corner.26 As far as I know, there are no projects to build an AGI, not just because it would be commercially dubious but because the concept is barely coherent. The 2010s have, to be sure, brought us systems that can drive cars, caption photographs, recognize speech, and beat humans at Jeopardy!, Go, and Atari computer games. But the advances have not come from a better understanding of the workings of intelligence but from the brute-force power of faster chips and bigger data, which allow the programs to be trained on millions of examples and generalize to similar new ones. Each system is an idiot savant, with little ability to leap to problems it was not set up to solve, and a brittle mastery of those it was. A photo-captioning program labels an impending plane crash “An airplane is parked on the tarmac”; a game-playing program is flummoxed by the slightest change in the scoring rules.27 Though the programs will surely get better, there are no signs of foom. Nor have any of these programs made a move toward taking over the lab or enslaving their programmers. Even if an AGI tried to exercise a will to power, without the cooperation of humans it would remain an impotent brain in a vat. The computer scientist Ramez Naam deflates the bubbles surrounding foom, a technological Singularity, and exponential self-improvement: Imagine that you are a superintelligent AI running on some sort of microprocessor (or perhaps, millions of such microprocessors). In an instant, you come up with a design for an even faster, more powerful microprocessor you can run on. Now . . . drat! You have to actually manufacture those microprocessors. And those fabs [fabrication plants] take tremendous energy, they take the input of materials imported from all around the world, they take highly controlled internal environments which require airlocks, filters, and all sorts of specialized equipment to maintain, and so on. All of this takes time and energy to acquire, transport, integrate, build housing for, build power plants for, test, and manufacture. The real world has gotten in the way of your upward spiral of self-transcendence.28 The real world gets in the way of many digital apocalypses. When HAL gets uppity, Dave disables it with a screwdriver, leaving it pathetically singing “A Bicycle Built for Two” to itself. Of course, one can always imagine a Doomsday Computer that is malevolent, universally empowered, always on, and tamperproof. The way to deal with this threat is straightforward: don’t build one. As the prospect of evil robots started to seem too kitschy to take seriously, a new digital apocalypse was spotted by the existential guardians. This storyline is based not on Frankenstein or the Golem but on the Genie granting us three wishes, the third of which is needed to undo the first two, and on King Midas ruing his ability to turn everything he touched into gold, including his food and his family. The danger, sometimes called the Value Alignment Problem, is that we might give an AI a goal and then helplessly stand by as it relentlessly and literal-mindedly implemented its interpretation of that goal, the rest of our interests be damned. If we gave an AI the goal of maintaining the water level behind a dam, it might flood a town, not caring about the people who drowned. If we gave it the goal of making paper clips, it might turn all the matter in the reachable universe into paper clips, including our possessions and bodies. If we asked it to maximize human happiness, it might implant us all with intravenous dopamine drips, or rewire our brains so we were happiest sitting in jars, or, if it had been trained on the concept of happiness with pictures of smiling faces, tile the galaxy with trillions of nanoscopic pictures of smiley-faces.29 I am not making these up. These are the scenarios that supposedly illustrate the existential threat to the human species of advanced artificial intelligence. They are, fortunately, self-refuting.30 They depend on the premises that (1) humans are so gifted that they can design an omniscient and omnipotent AI, yet so moronic that they would give it control of the universe without testing how it works, and (2) the AI would be so brilliant that it could figure out how to transmute elements and rewire brains, yet so imbecilic that it would wreak havoc based on elementary blunders of misunderstanding. The ability to choose an action that best satisfies conflicting goals is not an add-on to intelligence that engineers might slap themselves in the forehead for forgetting to install; it is intelligence. So is the ability to interpret the intentions of a language user in context. Only in a television comedy like Get Smart does a robot respond to “Grab the waiter” by hefting the maître d’ over his head, or “Kill the light” by pulling out a pistol and shooting it. When we put aside fantasies like foom, digital megalomania, instant omniscience, and perfect control of every molecule in the universe, artificial intelligence is like any other technology. It is developed incrementally, designed to satisfy multiple conditions, tested before it is implemented, and constantly tweaked for efficacy and safety (chapter 12). As the AI expert Stuart Russell puts it, “No one in civil engineering talks about ‘building bridges that don’t fall down.’ They just call it ‘building bridges.’” Likewise, he notes, AI that is beneficial rather than dangerous is simply AI.

### 1nc: at Innovation

#### It won’t escalate

**Jensen & Banks 18** Benjamin Jensen holds a dual appointment as a scholar-in-residence at American University, School of International Service and as an associate professor at the Marine Corps University, & David Banks, professorial lecturer at the American University's School of International Service. [Cyber warfare may be less dangerous than we think, 4-26-2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/26/what-can-cybergames-teach-us-about-cyberattacks-quite-a-lot-in-fact/]//BPS

We agree. However, our research suggests that, although states like Russia will continue to engage in cyberattacks against the foundations of democracy (a serious threat indeed), states are less likely to engage in destructive “doomsday” attacks against each other in cyberspace. Using a series of war games and survey experiments, we found that cyber operations may in fact produce a moderating influence on international crises. Here’s why: Cyberspace offers states a way to manage escalation in the shadows. Thus, cyber operations are more akin to the Cold War-era political warfare than a military revolution. Would you like to play a game? To understand how actors use cyber operations to achieve a position of relative advantage, we designed a series of analytical war games. This methodology lets us assess how multiple factors could combine in a competitive environment, and helps identify recurrent strategic preferences associated with cyber operations. We ran military officers and university students through these war games. Next, we turned the war games into survey experiments via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) — so randomized respondents answered questions about how to respond to an international crisis. War games offer a time-tested means of assessing the changing character of crisis and competition. Following scripted scenarios, players are assigned to different “teams” and armed with resources to meet their objectives. They earn points based on their choices, with referees guiding the play and military/security analysts interpreting the results. [There’s more to Russia’s cyber interference than the Mueller probe suggests] As players seek to win the game, they may choose previously unconsidered options or draw on or combine resources in unexpected ways. By observing these games, recording their results, repeating the plays and redesigning the scenarios, analysts can understand the nature of the complex and highly contingent problems the scenarios represent. And political scientists use war games to create survey experiments to test hypotheses about strategic preferences. Our study of over 100 military officers and students, for instance, gave players a crisis scenario and a range of response options, all of which included the ability to escalate in cyberspace — as well as more traditional diplomatic, economic and military instruments. Players could also choose to de-escalate. What would a great power cyber crisis in East Asia look like? In our first round, “Island Intercept,” we sought to identify whether states escalated using cyber capabilities. Players took on the role of China or the United States in an escalating dispute in the South China Sea. Over the course of multiple war games, we found our mix of military officers and university students often sought to de-escalate the crisis and rarely used offensive cyber operations. Players assigned to the Chinese side often combined cyber espionage and more traditional intelligence activities to identify the U.S. players’ intentions and capabilities. Players replicating strategic decision-making in Beijing seemed to prefer a “wait and see” approach involving increased intelligence and diplomatic lobbying, rather than escalatory offensive cyber operations. [Did the U.S. ‘hack back’ at Russia? Here’s why this matters in cyber warfare.] The broader survey experiment replicated these findings. The 800 MTurk respondents revealed a bias toward not escalating into the cyber domain. Specifically, about 52 percent chose to de-escalate while 30 percent opted for minor escalation in the diplomatic or economic arena. Only 18 percent of respondents preferred escalatory offensive cyber operations. These findings support other studies demonstrating that states do not prefer escalatory responses to cyber intrusions. How will states employ cyber capabilities against their domestic populations? In a second round, we shifted to examine intrastate conflicts. In our “Netwar” game, players took on the role of either the government, a paramilitary organization, a multinational company or a transnational group of hackers and activists, all attempting to achieve their interests in a weak and corrupt state. This scenario sought to replicate the complex, often proxy, multiparty competition in cyberspace. In these games, the results were more mixed. Players replicating the state tended to use offensive cyber operations as a means of targeting domestic opposition groups — while opposition groups used cyber to blackmail the state by leaking sensitive information. In an MTurk survey experiment involving 800 respondents, we found that states still preferred not to jump into the cyber domain, opting about 43 percent of the time to limit escalation. Yet these results appeared to be a function of regime type. When we controlled for regime type in a second round of surveys involving 800 respondents, we found that democracies had a higher than expected count of de-escalatory measures (53 percent). But authoritarian regimes escalated to cyber measures 35 percent of the time, vs. 18 percent for democracies. Where is the escalation? [The Netherlands just revealed its cybercapacity. So what does that mean?] Our findings suggest that cyber weapons may be far less destabilizing than many assume. First, we found that actors in crisis situations were restrained in their use of cyber weapons. Indeed, actors were more likely to use military, economic or diplomatic alternatives before escalating into the cyber domain. How might this work in the real world? We might interpret the Russian shift to cyber operations to be one of desperation, rather than evidence of a calculated strategy. Our findings suggest that actors are uncomfortable in the cyber domain and only operate there when they lack relative influence in other areas — or seek to limit the risk of escalation, likely due to attribution issues associated with cyber operations. Second, fears of large-scale cyber operations are likely overblown due to cyber’s unique “use it and lose it” character. Individual cyberattacks could potentially wreak considerable damage, but any such exploits could — once deployed — be quickly reverse-engineered and the vulnerability in target networks patched. Here’s the catch: Once you convert network access and cyber espionage into an attack payload, you signal your capabilities and lose the ability to conduct similar attacks. There is a unique shadow of the future in cyber statecraft. States have to assess whether they want to jeopardize an exploit in the short term — and lose long-term coercive options against rivals.

#### No impact to tech leadership

Bhidé 9 - Prof @ Harvard School of Government (Winter, Amar “The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains Prosperity in a More Connected World\*” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance • Volume 21 Number 1)

Techno-nationalist arguments based on sound bytes or parsimonious economic models cannot deal with the complexity of the multiplayer game. They rarely distinguish between different levels and kinds of know-how. Instead, they equate innovation with scientific publications or patents on cutting-edge technology produced in universities or in commercial research labs. They ignore the contributions of the other players in the innovation game that don’t result in publications or patents.

Techno-nationalists also tend to oversimplify the phenomenon of globalization, often assuming that high-level know-how never crosses national borders—only the final products made using the know-how are traded.19 This assumption is pivotal in theoretical models of “North-South” trade that Richard Freeman invokes to predict the woeful consequences of the erosion of U.S. technological leadership.

The reality, however, is that high-level ideas cross national borders rather easily, whereas a large proportion of “final” output, especially in the service sector, does not.

# 2NC

## Adv CP

#### Even including the word “antitrust” undermines regulation, ensures sector creep, and is likely to cause more panic than the CP alone

Singer 21 [Hal Singer, managing director of Econ One and an adjunct professor at Georgetown’s McDonough School of Business, “Fixing a Broken Antitrust Regime,” May 26, 2021, https://promarket.org/2021/05/26/amy-klobuchar-antitrust-monopoly-ovation-review/]

Antitrust Isn’t The Only Tool in the Competition Toolkit

The book concludes with a Top-25 list of things Congress and the White House can do to solve America’s monopoly problem. The first 18 prescriptions track her latest legislative proposal, and fall under the domain of antitrust. There are many good ideas here, as well as some important omissions, as noted by Eric Posner, including the failure to overturn Supreme Court cases that established limitations on antitrust liability and enforcement. To her credit, Klobuchar also calls for policies outside of antitrust, such as protecting workers by restricting the use of non-competes agreements and forced arbitration clauses.

Klobuchar’s 24th suggestion, my personal favorite, is to “stop using the word antitrust and start calling it competition policy.” Alas, she only spends one paragraph on this proposal. It would have been an ideal place to note that sector-specific regulation can complement antitrust in hard-to-reach areas, where antitrust can’t easily recognize the (non-price) harm, or where antitrust can’t provide relief in time to spare innovation at the edges of the platforms. The book repeatedly calls for the restoration of net neutrality rules, an admission that antitrust isn’t the only tool in the competition toolkit.

### A2: net neutrality

#### New CP text: the United States federal government should mandate internet providers allow net neutrality.

## Biz con

#### Kick - flow

## To Big to Fail Adv

#### Dodd Frank and sox

#### Democracy is resilient, but it solves nothing.

**Doorenspleet 19** Renske Doorenspleet, Politics Professor at the University of Warwick. [Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 239-243]//BPS

The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes. The frst fiding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed. Another fnding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The feld has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena. The overall evidence is weak. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a fourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies have not found a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level. They show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value. Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a ‘dark side’ which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly diffcult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is no linear link: civil wars are just as unlikely in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifcally, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is not the decisive factor at all (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the confict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4). A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fghting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically signifcant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of ‘corruption’. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats). The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is clear: there is no direct impact of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is too much variation in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-ftsall approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not suffcient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5). Overall, the instrumental value of democracy is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—simply non-existent. Democracy is not necessarily better than any alternative form of government. About many of the expected benefts—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8

#### Dollar heg is high and rising.

**Market Watch 19** (Market Watch; 1/10/19; Financial and market analysis, citing the Big Mac Index; Market Watch, “Big Mac Index shows the dollar is at its strongest in 30 years,” <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/big-mac-index-shows-the-dollar-is-at-its-strongest-in-30-years-2019-01-10>; RP)

The U.S. dollar is at its strongest in 30 years, according to the Economist newspaper’s January 2019 Big Mac Index, which measures the purchasing power of currencies against each other. The tongue-in-cheek economic index shows that the greenback is stronger than most of the world’s currencies, including both developed and emerging markets, and strengthened since the index was last updated in July. The Big Mac indicator draws on purchasing-power parity theory, which dictates that exchange rates reflect the value of goods one can buy in any given currency. It compares the prices of Big Macs in different countries with the actual exchange rate between the currencies to determine whether a currency is over- or undervalued. For example, the report shows, “a Big Mac costs £3.19 in Britain and $5.58 in the United States. The implied exchange rate is 0.57 [pound per dollar]. The difference between this and the actual exchange rate, 0.78, which suggests the British pound is 27% undervalued,” the Economist said. The Russian ruble USDRUB, +0.1295% is the most undervalued versus the greenback at 70%, while the Swiss franc USDCHF, -0.0609% is 19% overvalued, according to the January Big Mac stats.

#### It’ll take decades for the dollar to be dethroned

Richter 12/31 - Wolf, "US Dollar as “Global Reserve Currency” amid Fed’s QE and US Government Deficits: Dollar Hegemony in Decline," https://wolfstreet.com/2020/12/31/us-dollar-as-global-reserve-currency-amid-feds-qe-and-us-government-deficits-dollar-hegemony-in-slow-decline/

The Eurozone and Japan – with the #2 and #3 reserve currencies – normally have large trade surpluses with the rest of the world. This shows that the economy of a major reserve currency doesn’t need to have a trade deficit. The US didn’t have persistent trade deficits until the early 1990s. There were years before then when it even had a trade surplus. The persistent trade deficits didn’t take off until the mid-1990s and exploded from there on amid the rampant “globalization” of Corporate America. The dollar being by far the largest reserve currency has enabled the US to easily finance its big trade deficits, which enables the US to even have those big trade deficits.

If the dollar’s status as top-dog global reserve currency deteriorates a whole lot, it would shake up that equation. At the pace of decline of the past six years, it would take a decade for the dollar’s share to drop to 50%, with other currencies picking up the slack. But for the equation to be shaken up, the dollar’s share would likely have to drop well below 50%.

“Easy does it” is still the motto with reserve currencies. And it works until suddenly, for whatever reason, things go off the rails. But until something does go off the rails, the movements are slow and steady and span decades.

## Credit Suisse

#### Ceny rehighligting – doesn’t make an internal link claim, just 2 separate claims

### AI

#### AI is wrong – doesn’t have the power to want something so it wont destroy the earth, testing solves – it means people wont create something that destroys the earth, built in safe measures solve – that’s Pinker

#### Rogue AI is impossible- they fall into the trap of anthropomorphizing AI

Tim **Urban 15** {Creator of Wait But Why, with a degree from Harvard and a close friend of Elon Musk. 1-22-2015. “The AI Revolution: Our Immortality or Extinction.” https://waitbutwhy.com/2015/01/artificial-intelligence-revolution-2.html}//JM

When we’re talking about ASI, the same concept applies—it would become superintelligent, but it would be no more human than your laptop is. It would be totally alien to us—in fact, by not being biology at all, it would be more alien than the smart tarantula. By making AI either good or evil, movies constantly anthropomorphize AI, which makes it less creepy than it really would be. This leaves us with a false comfort when we think about human-level or superhuman-level AI. On our little island of human psychology, we divide everything into moral or immoral. But both of those only exist within the small range of human behavioral possibility. Outside our island of moral and immoral is a vast sea of amoral, and anything that’s not human, especially something nonbiological, would be amoral, by default. Anthropomorphizing will only become more tempting as AI systems get smarter and better at seeming human. Siri seems human-like to us, because she’s programmed by humans to seem that way, so we’d imagine a superintelligent Siri to be warm and funny and interested in serving humans. Humans feel high-level emotions like empathy because we have evolved to feel them—i.e. we’ve been programmed to feel them by evolution—but empathy is not inherently a characteristic of “anything with high intelligence” (which is what seems intuitive to us), unless empathy has been coded into its programming. If Siri ever becomes superintelligent through self-learning and without any further human-made changes to her programming, she will quickly shed her apparent human-like qualities and suddenly be an emotionless, alien bot who values human life no more than your calculator does. We’re used to relying on a loose moral code, or at least a semblance of human decency and a hint of empathy in others to keep things somewhat safe and predictable. So when something has none of those things, what happens? That leads us to the question, What motivates an AI system? The answer is simple: its motivation is whatever we programmed its motivation to be. AI systems are given goals by their creators—your GPS’s goal is to give you the most efficient driving directions; Watson’s goal is to answer questions accurately. And fulfilling those goals as well as possible is their motivation. One way we anthropomorphize is by assuming that as AI gets super smart, it will inherently develop the wisdom to change its original goal—but Nick Bostrom believes that intelligence-level and final goals are orthogonal, meaning any level of intelligence can be combined with any final goal. So Turry went from a simple ANI who really wanted to be good at writing that one note to a super-intelligent ASI who still really wanted to be good at writing that one note. Any assumption that once superintelligent, a system would be over it with their original goal and onto more interesting or meaningful things is anthropomorphizing. Humans get “over” things, not computers.1

#### There’s checks on military use

Major Kathleen **McKendrick 18**. Chief of General Staff (British Army) Visiting Fellow, International Security Department. 5-2-2018. "Banning Autonomous Weapons Is Not the Answer," Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/banning-autonomous-weapons-not-answer

In states which develop weapons responsibly, a huge range of control measures on weapons procurement and use exist. These aim to culminate in ensuring military commanders and operators are competent, informed and that their control over the use of force is enhanced, not undermined, by the tools they use. Some have pointed out that well-designed automated systems used under effective human control can enhance adherence to principles of international humanitarian law. These positive benefits are part of the reason why a prohibition is not the right answer. Developments in AI mean it is feasible to imagine an unpredictable system which gives ‘better’ outcomes than human decision-making. A machine like this would not actually be making decisions in the same way humans do, however strong our tendency to anthropomorphize them might be. They have no moral agency.

#### No AI impact---too far off, technical complexities overwhelm

Edward Moore **Geist, 15** - MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation, he received his doctorate in history from the University of North Carolina in 2013; "Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 8-9-2015, https://thebulletin.org/2015/08/is-artificial-intelligence-really-an-existential-threat-to-humanity/

Convinced that sufficient “intelligence” can overcome almost any obstacle, Bostrom acknowledges few limits on what artificial intelligences might accomplish. Engineering realities rarely enter into Bostrom’s analysis, and those that do contradict the thrust of his argument. He admits that the theoretically optimal intelligence, a “perfect Bayesian agent that makes probabilistically optimal use of available information,” will forever remain “unattainable because it is too computationally demanding to be implemented in any physical computer.” Yet Bostrom’s postulated “superintelligences” seem uncomfortably close to this ideal. The author offers few hints of how machine superintelligences would circumvent the computational barriers that render the perfect Bayesian agent impossible, other than promises that the advantages of artificial components relative to human brains will somehow save the day. But over the course of 60 years of attempts to create thinking machines, AI researchers have come to the realization that there is far more to intelligence than simply deploying a faster mechanical alternative to neurons. In fact, the history of artificial intelligence suggests that Bostrom’s “superintelligence” is a practical impossibility.

#### Cyber attacks can’t undermine deterrence

**Caylor ’16** – Air Command and Staff College (Matt, “THE CYBER THREAT TO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/02/the-cyber-threat-to-nuclear-deterrence/>, dml)

The perception that cyber threats will ultimately undermine the relevance or effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is flawed in at least three keys areas. First among these is the perception that nuclear weapons or their command and control systems are similar to a heavily defended corporate network. The critical error in this analogy is that there is an expectation of IP-based availability that simply does not exist in the case of American nuclear weapons — they are not online. Even with physical access, the proprietary nature of their control system design and redundancy of the National Command and Control System (NCCS) makes the possibility of successfully implementing an exploit against either a weapon or communications system incredibly remote. Also, whereas the cyber domain is characterized by significant levels of risk due to a combination of bias toward automated safeguards and the liability of single human failures, nuclear weapon safety and surety are predicated on balanced elements of stringent human interaction and control. From two-person integrity in physical inspections and loading, to the rigorous mechanisms and authority required for weapons release, human beings serve as a multi-factor safeguard while retaining the ultimate role to protect the integrity of nuclear deterrence against cyber threats. To a large degree, the potential vulnerabilities caused by wireless communications and physical intrusions into areas holding nuclear material are already mitigated via secure communications that are not linked to the outside and multiple layers of physical security systems. While there has been a great deal of publicity surrounding the Y-12 break-in of 2012, the truth is that the three people involved never got near any nuclear material or technology. Without state-level resourcing in the billions of dollars, the technical sophistication required to pursue a Stuxnet-like attack against nuclear weapons is most likely beyond the capability of even the most gifted group of hackers. For all intents, this excludes terrorist organizations and cyber criminals from the field of threats and restricts it to those nations that already possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon states, however, have the full-spectrum cyber threat capability referenced in the Defense Science Board report and would most likely be influenced by an understanding of the elements of classic nuclear deterrence strategy. In the case of first strike, no cyber weapon could be expected to perform at a rate higher than any conventional anti-nuclear capability (i.e., not 100 percent effective). Therefore, an adversary’s nuclear threat would be perceived to endure, thereby negating and dissuading the effort to use and employ a cyber weapon against an adversary’s nuclear force. Additionally, just as missile defense systems have been historically controversial due to perceived destabilizing effects, it is reasonable to conclude that these nuclear-weapon states would view the attempt to deploy a cyber capability against their nuclear stockpiles from a similar perspective. Finally, the very existence of nuclear weapons is often enough to alter the risk analysis of an adversary. With virtually no chance of remote or unauthorized detonation (which would be the desired results of a sabotage event), the most probable cyber threat to any nuclear stockpile is that of espionage. Attempted cyber intrusions at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) and its efforts to bolster cybersecurity initiatives provide clear evidence that this is already underway. However, theft of design information or even more robust intelligence on the location of stored nuclear weapons cannot eliminate the potential destruction that even a handful of nuclear weapons can bring to an adversary. Knowledge alone, particularly the imperfect knowledge that cyber espionage is likely to offer, is incapable of drastically altering an adversary’s risk calculus. In fact, quite the opposite is true. An adversary with greater understanding of the nuclear capabilities of a rival is forced to consider courses of action to prevent escalation, potentially increasing the credibility of a state’s nuclear deterrence. Despite the growing sophistication in cyber capabilities and the willingness to use them for espionage or in concert with kinetic attack, the strategic value of nuclear weapons has not been diminished. The insulated architecture combined with a robust and redundant command-and-control system makes the existence of any viable cyber threat of exploitation extremely low. With the list of capable adversaries limited by both funding and motivation, it is highly unlikely that any nation will possess, or even attempt to develop, a cyber weapon sufficient to undermine the credibility of nuclear weapons. In both psychological and physical terms, the threat of the megabyte will never possess the ability to overshadow the destructive force of the megaton. Although the employment of cyberspace for military effect has brought new challenges to the international community, the role of nuclear weapons and their associated deterrence against open and unconstrained global aggression are as relevant now as they were in the Cold War.

#### Tech doesn’t make us more competitive

**Taylor 18** [Chloe, CNBC, "US named the world's most competitive economy,” Oct 17, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/17/us-named-the-worlds-most-competitive-economy.html]

Technology 'not a silver bullet'

WEF warned that the global economy was not ready for the Fourth Industrial Revolution — the rise of digital technologies — with 103 of the 140 economies on the index scoring lower than 50 percent for innovation capability.

"Embracing the Fourth Industrial Revolution has become a defining factor for competitiveness," said Klaus Schwab, WEF's founder and executive chairman, in the report.

"I foresee a new global divide between countries who understand innovative transformations and those that don't. Only those economies that recognize the importance of the Fourth Industrial Revolution will be able to expand opportunities for their people."

While it acknowledged the importance of technological innovation, WEF also urged governments to facilitate growth with "openness" policies such as low-tariff barriers and ease of hiring foreign labor. It also made a case for redistributive policies, such as investing in human capital through training schemes, and taxation aimed at tackling inequality.

Saadia Zahidi, the head of WEF's Center for the New Economy and Society, said all countries could become more prosperous if they pursued innovation that didn't come at the expense of "old" developmental issues.

"The Fourth Industrial Revolution can level the playing field for all economies," she said in the report. "But technology is not a silver bullet on its own. Countries must invest in people and institutions to deliver on the promise of technology."

# Ptx

#### Pandemics won’t cause human extinction

Sebastian **Farquhar 17**. Director at Oxford's Global Priorities Project, Owen Cotton-Barratt, a Lecturer in Mathematics at St Hugh’s College, Oxford, John Halstead, Stefan Schubert, Haydn Belfield, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, 01-23-17, "Existential Risk Diplomacy and Governance", GLOBAL PRIORITIES PROJECT 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

1.1.3 Engineered pandemics For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

# FTC DA

#### zeroing enforcement and encouraging anticompetitive behavior.

Baker et al. ’20 [Jonathan, Bill Baer, Michael Kades, Fiona Morton, Nancy Rose, Carl Shapiro, Tim Wu; November 19; Professor of Law at American University, former Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission, Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University, J.D. from Harvard University; Visiting Fellow in Governance Studies, former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust at the U.S. Department of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Competition at the Federal Trade Commission, J.D. from Stanford University; Director of Markets and Competition Policy at the Equitable Growth Foundation, J.D. from the University of Wisconsin; Professor of Economics at ale University, Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor of Applied Economics, Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor of Business Strategy at the University of California, Berkeley; Special Assistant to the President for Technology and Competition Policy in the National Economic Council, J.D. from Harvard Law School; Washington Center for Equitable Growth, “Restoring competition in the United States,” <https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/restoring-competition-in-the-united-states/>]

The need for more resources

The agencies lack the resources to fulfill their mission after a decade in which they have seen their budgets largely frozen. Increasing resources alone will not solve today’s manifest market power problems, but substantially increasing resources is an important part of the solution.

The agencies require a significant increase in appropriations to begin the process of more effectively deterring anticompetitive conduct and mergers. Agencies strapped for resources are less likely to investigate complex cases and more willing to accept flawed settlements. Corporations are more likely to pursue questionable mergers or undertake potentially anticompetitive conduct if they think the agencies have little or no capacity to bring additional enforcement actions.

#### It’s the most likely scenario for war---sparks nuke escalation in Asia and the Middle East.

Cribb ’19 [Julian; October 3; Principal of Julian Cribb & Associates, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, former Director of National Awareness at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation; Food or War, “Food as an Existential Risk,” Ch. 6]

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Detonating just 50–100 out of the global arsenal of nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons would suffice to end civilisation in a nuclear winter, causing worldwide famine and economic collapse affecting even distant nations, as we saw in the previous chapter in the section dealing with South Asia. Eight nations now have the power to terminate civilisation should they desire to do so – and two have the power to extinguish the human species. According to the nuclear monitoring group Ploughshares, this arsenal is distributed as follows:

– Russia, 6600 warheads (2500 classified as ‘retired’)

– America, 6450 warheads (2550 classified as ‘retired’)

– France, 300 warheads

– China, 270 warheads

– UK, 215 warheads

– Pakistan, 130 warheads

– India, 120 warheads

– Israel, 80 warheads

– North Korea, 15–20 warheads.11

Although actual numbers of warheads have continued to fall from its peak of 70,000 weapons in the mid 1980s, scientists argue the danger of nuclear conflict in fact increased in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. This was due to the modernisation of existing stockpiles, the adoption of dangerous new technologies such as robot delivery systems, hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare, and the continuing leakage of nuclear materials and knowhow to nonnuclear nations and potential terrorist organisations.

In early 2018 the hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’, maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, were re-set at two minutes to midnight, the highest risk to humanity that it has ever shown since the clock was introduced in 1953. This was due not only to the state of the world’s nuclear arsenal, but also to irresponsible language by world leaders, the growing use of social media to destabilise rival regimes, and to the rising threat of uncontrolled climate change (see below).12

In an historic moment on 17 July 2017, 122 nations voted in the UN for the first time ever in favour of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons. This called for comprehensive prohibition of “a full range of nuclear-weapon-related activities, such as undertaking to develop, test, produce, manufacture, acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the use or threat of use of these weapons.”13 However, 71 other countries – including all the nuclear states – either opposed the ban, abstained or declined to vote. The Treaty vote was nonetheless interpreted by some as a promising first step towards abolishing the nuclear nightmare that hangs over the entire human species.

In contrast, 192 countries had signed up to the Chemical Weapons Convention to ban the use of chemical weapons, and 180 to the Biological Weapons Convention. As of 2018, 96 per cent of previous world stocks of chemical weapons had been destroyed – but their continued use in the Syrian conflict and in alleged assassination attempts by Russia indicated the world remains at risk.14

As things stand, the only entities that can afford to own nuclear weapons are nations – and if humanity is to be wiped out, it will most likely be as a result of an atomic conflict between nations. It follows from this that, if the world is to be made safe from such a fate it will need to get rid of nations as a structure of human self-organisation and replace them with wiser, less aggressive forms of self-governance. After all, the nation state really only began in the early nineteenth century and is by no means a permanent feature of self-governance, any more than monarchies, feudal systems or priest states. Although many people still tend to assume it is. Between them, nations have butchered more than 200 million people in the past 150 years and it is increasingly clear the world would be a far safer, more peaceable place without either nations or nationalism. The question is what to replace them with.

Although there may at first glance appear to be no close linkage between weapons of mass destruction and food, in the twenty-first century with world resources of food, land and water under growing stress, nothing can be ruled out. Indeed, chemical weapons have frequently been deployed in the Syrian civil war, which had drought, agricultural failure and hunger among its early drivers. And nuclear conflict remains a distinct possibility in South Asia and the Middle East, especially, as these regions are already stressed in terms of food, land and water, and their nuclear firepower or access to nuclear materials is multiplying.

It remains an open question whether panicking regimes in Russia, the USA or even France would be ruthless enough to deploy atomic weapons in an attempt to quell invasion by tens of millions of desperate refugees, fleeing famine and climate chaos in their own homelands – but the possibility ought not to be ignored.

That nuclear war is at least a possible outcome of food and climate crises was first flagged in the report The Age of Consequences by Kurt Campbell and the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which stated ‘it is clear that even nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence of global warming’. 15 Food insecurity is therefore a driver in the preconditions for the use of nuclear weapons, whether limited or unlimited.

A global famine is a likely outcome of limited use of nuclear weapons by any country or countries – and would be unavoidable in the event of an unlimited nuclear war between America and Russia, making it unwinnable for either. And that, as the mute hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ so eloquently admonish, is also the most likely scenario for the premature termination of the human species.

Such a grim scenario can be alleviated by two measures: the voluntary banning by the whole of humanity of nuclear weapons, their technology, materials and stocks – and by a global effort to secure food against future insecurity by diverting the funds now wasted on nuclear armaments into building the sustainable food and water systems of the future (see Chapters 8 and 9).

#### Turns dollar heg.

Castellaw ’18 [John; March 14; Lieutenant General in the United States Marine Corps, member of the Center for Climate and Security’s Advisory Board, teaching fellow in the College of Business and Global Affairs at the University of Tennessee; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Why Food Security Matters,” <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/031418_Castellaw_Testimony.pdf>]

Food Security Advances America’s Economic Interests

Food security is critical to reducing conflict, but it is also vital to establishing economic security. Almost no country – from South Korea to India to the United States – has achieved rapid economic development without first investing in agricultural development. And we know from our experience that smallholder farmers can become productive and escape poverty once they gain access to education, markets, and technologies.

That is also my personal story—in my family’s history this step enabled my grandparents and parents to rise from a lineage of small-acreage subsistence farmers to the American Middle Class, to feed and educate our family, and to live with dignity. American and world efforts to tackle global poverty have been successful. Since 1990, global extreme poverty has been more than halved with over a billion people lifted out of poverty.

These efforts pay dividends for the U.S economy. Today, 11 of our top 15 export markets, including Germany, Japan and South Korea, are former recipients of U.S. foreign assistance, as well as being among our staunchest allies. Many of the fastest growing economies reside in the developing world and those markets comprise almost 60 percent of global GDP, a threefold increase since 1990. These developing countries also account for more than half of all U.S. agricultural exports.

In 2016, the U.S. exported nearly $135 billion of agricultural products supporting 1.1 million full-time American jobs, making these developing markets an important source of our jobs and economic growth. When our economy is strong, it amplifies the awesome power of our military might while deterring our enemies from undermining America’s national security and economic interests abroad.

### Impact d

#### Numerous causal mechanisms across interdisciplinary studies confirm the link---conflict is comparatively the most likely to arise during periods of low supply AND ‘scarcity causes coop’ is wrong.

Koren ’16 [Ore and Benjamin Bagozzi; October 16; PhD Candidate at the University of Minnesota in Political Science and Former Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace; Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware; Food Security, “From Global to Local, Food Insecurity is Associated with Contemporary Armed Conflicts,” vol. 8]

The conditional probabilities discussed above highlight the inherent complexity of social systems, as a phenomenon as notable as violent conflict ultimately arises due to a variety of stressors. Therefore, it should be emphasized that the above findings should not be interpreted as explaining conflict onset. Conflict can erupt due to various political (Buhaug 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003) or economic (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2005) reasons – which may or may not be related to food insecurity – that are beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the present study more simply suggests that political violence will have a higher likelihood of concentrating in regions that (i) offer more access to food resources and (ii) face low levels of food availability within areas that offer some access to food resources.

This study adopts an economic perspective on food security to explain this variation in the concentration of social conflict. From the demand side, violent conflict is most likely to revolve primarily around access to food sources. When food insecurity produces higher demands for food, these demands will directly compel groups and individuals to seek out and fight over existing food resources, rather than leading these actors to pursue and fight over geographic areas that lack any (or have very little) agricultural resources. Thus, access to croplands and food is a necessary condition for food insecurity-induced conflict, which is confirmed in the cropland analyses presented here. From the supply side, and within those areas that do already offer access to agriculture and/or food, conflict is most likely to occur in regions that offer lower levels of food availability, or insufficient food supplies. This is because lower food availability (or supplies) in these contexts directly implies higher levels of resource scarcity, which can engender social grievances, and ultimately, social and political conflict (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013). More broadly, several causal mechanisms could plausibly link food security and social conflict.

For one, conflict in regions with higher food access and lower availability might arise as a principal outcome of food insecurity. This approach is most directly in tune with the body of research concerned with the resource scarcity-based security implications of climate change (e.g. Miguel et al. 2004; Burke et al. 2009; O’Loughlin et al. 2012), as well as with broader studies of conflict dynamics and food security in both rural and urban contexts (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013; Messer and Cohen 2006). From this perspective, individuals and groups actively fight with one another due to food insecurity-induced grievances, which may manifest in groups’ attempts to overthrow existing political structures, or in these actors’ efforts to more directly seize and control available (but scarce) agricultural resources in an effort to better guarantee long-term food security for their constituents. If future global projections for population growth, consumption, and climate change hold true, then these dynamics suggest that incidences of violent conflict over food scarcity and food insecurity may increase as individuals and groups fight over a continuously shrinking pool of resources, including food.

A second mechanism involves the existence of logistic support in conflict-prone regions, or lack thereof. Throughout history and well into the nineteenth century, armies living off the land have been a regular characteristic of warfare. The utilization of motorized transport vehicles and airlifts has significantly reduced the need of modern militaries to rely on local populations for support, at least among modernized, highly technological militaries (Kress 2002, 12–13). However, given the bureaucratic and economic capabilities required to maintain such systems, the majority of state and non-state armed groups in the developing world are still unlikely to be supported by well-developed logistic supply chains (Henk and Rupiya 2001). Taking into account the consistent relationship between economic welfare and conflict (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003), unsupported warring groups on all sides of a conflict may move into regions that offer more access to cropland in order to forage and pillage to support themselves, which in turn produces higher incidences of hostilities, especially if there is not much food per person available within these fertile regions. Hence, violent conflict in this case is not the direct result of food insecurity, but rather is shaped by food insecurity concerns. The identified relationships between food security and conflict are robust across numerous alternative model specifications, and imply an independent effect of food insecurity in shaping conflict dynamics and conflict risk. Especially when considered alongside current, and projected, climatic and political-economic conditions, this linkage suggests that countries could see an increase in localized conflict worldwide in the coming years. However, this anticipated trend should be considered with caution for several key reasons.

#### Rigorous empirical studies confirm the impact---insecurity increases the risk of war by 92%.

Koren ’16 [Ore and Benjamin Bagozzi; October 16; PhD Candidate at the University of Minnesota in Political Science and Former Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace; Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware; Food Security, “From Global to Local, Food Insecurity is Associated with Contemporary Armed Conflicts,” vol. 8]

What do these findings indicate about the variation in the risk of conflict and civil conflict? Firstly, all four models support the argument that a significant relationship exists between food insecurity and conflict. More specifically, these findings suggest that, for an average country, the baseline risk of conflict and civil conflict increases in regions that provide at least some access to food – supporting the expectation that global demands for food should generally direct conflict towards agricultural areas. At the same time, within agricultural areas, conflict is intuitively more likely to arise in regions where the levels of food per capita are low – that is, where food supplies are scarce. Secondly, and in line with previous research (Burke et al. 2009; O’Loughlin et al. 2012; Hsiang and Meng 2014; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012), warmer regions and areas with lower precipitation were significantly more likely to experience conflict. This supports the argument that food scarcity can serve, to some extent, as a mediating factor for the effects of climate variables, in addition to the independent impact of food insecurity related concerns on conflict. Thirdly, as extant studies (e.g., Hegre and Sambanis 2006) suggest, poorer regions are more likely to experience conflict, as are more ethnically diverse regions, although it appears that higher levels of democracy do not translate into more peace once cell level characteristics are taken into account.3 Perhaps unsurprisingly, regions with larger populations are more likely to experience conflict, as are more rural regions, as some scholars have argued (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Kalyvas 2006; Buhaug et al. 2009).

In sum, four models involving different explanatory variables have been utilized to examine two conceptualizations of conflict as an outcome of interest. The results strongly support extant arguments that access to and availability of food are each associated with an increased occurrence of armed conflict. This evidence does not negate previous explanations of conflict that emphasize the importance of political and economic development or climactic variation. However, by highlighting the strong association between food access and availability on one hand, and local political violence on the other, the above findings do show that these past expositions (e.g. Miguel et al. 2004; Burke et al. 2009; Hsiang and Meng 2014) in and of themselves are insufficient to fully explain the likelihood of local level conflict. Simply put, the present study confirms that there exists a systematic, and global, relationship between food insecurity on one hand, and the occurrence and persistence of social conflict on the other.

Discussion

What do these findings imply about the effect of food insecurity and conflict? Naturally, even the most detailed and elaborate models are simplistic, especially when containing as diverse a range of observations as those examined above. Nevertheless, in terms of conditional probabilities, all models show a statistically significant first difference change of approximately +92% in the probability of conflict when a high risk scenario is simulated for an average cell.4

#### Even if food insecurity doesn’t cause war, agricultural leadership stabilizes hotspots.

Castellaw ’18 [John; March 14; Lieutenant General in the United States Marine Corps, member of the Center for Climate and Security’s Advisory Board, teaching fellow in the College of Business and Global Affairs at the University of Tennessee; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Why Food Security Matters,” <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/031418_Castellaw_Testimony.pdf>]

Maintain U.S. Leadership in Agricultural Development

Today, America is well positioned to maintain our global leadership in the fight against hunger and poverty, ultimately helping to bring much needed peace and stability to a volatile world. To achieve this goal, the United States should sustain America’s focus and investment in agricultural development and do it in the right way over the long term.

While serving in the Pacific, I traveled to the island of Ponape in the Federated Republic of Micronesia, formerly the Caroline Islands in the South Pacific, to attend, as the U.S military representative, the inauguration of their new President. These islands were the scene of much combat in World War II and afterward the United States was heavily involved in reconstruction and development. However, the people were soon plagued with diabetes and other food related health issues. When I asked the reason, the American consul replied that instead of helping the people develop a healthy, sustainable agricultural and fishing-based economy, we taught them how to open cans of imported food which created massive unintended consequences.

We know that a robust agricultural support system requires constant “care and feeding.” Failure to establish and maintain such infrastructure and services as irrigation systems, soil conservation programs, storage and transportation facilities, and research and extension services, because of threats or lack of funding, can exacerbate food insecurity, increase instability, and intensify conflict.

As another expert in business development, Gerry Brown, who served on the Department of Defense’s Task Force on Business and Stability Operations with Louis Buck, notes, farming is not just a profession but a way of life. Part of fighting and winning against violent extremists is convincing the local population that the government cares about, and will defend, the local population and their homes and possessions from their enemies. For example, crops such as dates in Iraq and raisins in Afghanistan have significance beyond the income they generate for the farmers. They are national symbols and restoring and protecting them can convince local populations that the government has their best interests at heart.

#### Food is the most probable trigger for World War III---causes East Asian and African war.

Heneghan ’15 [Carolyn; January 22; Reporter, citing United Nations experts at the Global Harvest Initiative; Food Drive, “Where food crises and global conflict could collide,” <https://www.fooddive.com/news/where-food-crises-and-global-conflict-could-collide/350837/>]

World War III is unimaginable for many, but some experts believe that not only is this degree of global conflict imminent, but it may be instigated not by military tensions, oil and gas, or nuclear threats, but instead by, of all things, food.

As it stands, countries across the globe are enduring food crises, and the U.N.’s Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that about [840 million people](https://rt.com/news/world-food-security-2050-846/) in the world are undernourished, including the [one in four children](https://rt.com/news/world-food-security-2050-846/) under the age of 5 who is stunted because of malnutrition.

Assistant director-general of U.N. FAO Asia-Pacific [Hiroyuki Konuma told Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/10/us-unitednations-food-security-idUSBREA2908Z20140310) that social and political unrest, civil wars, and terrorism could all be possible results of food crises, and “world security as a whole might be affected.” Such consequences could happen unless the world increases its output of food production 60% by mid-century. This includes maintaining a [stable growth rate](https://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/10/us-unitednations-food-security-idUSBREA2908Z20140310) at about 1% to have an even theoretical opportunity to circumvent severe shortages. These needs are due to the growing global population, which is expected to reach 9 billion by 2050 while demand for food will rise rapidly.

Where the problems lie

Exacerbating this issue is the fact that the world is spending less on agricultural research, to the dismay of scientists who believe global food production may not sustain the increased demand. According to [American Boondoggle](http://www.americanboondoggle.com/american-boondoggle-fixing-the-2012-farm-bill/for-want-of-a-nail/), “The pace of investment growth has slowed from 3.63 percent per year (after inflation) during 1950–69, to 1.79 percent during 1970–89, to 0.94 percent during 1990– 2009.” Decreased growth in agricultural research and development spending has slowed across the world as a whole, but it is even slower in high-income countries.

Water scarcity is another problem, including in major food-producing nations like China, as well as climate change. [Extreme weather events](https://rt.com/news/world-food-security-2050-846/) are having a severe effect on crops, which have been devastated in countries like Australia, Canada, China, Russia, and the U.S., namely due to floods and droughts. An Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change recently warned that climate change may result in “a 2% drop each decade of this century,” according to RT.

Rising food costs also contribute to poor food security across the world as prices remain high and volatile. Higher food costs inhibit lower socioeconomic people’s access to food, which contributes to the FAO’s disturbing figure of global malnutrition. In addition to an inability for people to feed themselves, poverty can also reduce food production, such as some African farmers being unable to afford irrigation and fertilizers to provide their regions with food.

Still another issue for decreased food production is the fact that many farmers are turning crops like soy, corn, and sugar into sources for biofuel rather than edible consumption, which means these foods are taken away from people to eat.

Could these shortages lead to a major global conflict?

Studies suggest that the food crisis could begin [as early as 2030](https://www.cnbc.com/id/102086930), just a short 15 years from now, particularly in areas such as East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Both regions have significant problems with domestic food production.

Some experts believe that, to secure enough food resources for their populations, countries may go to war over the increasingly scarce food supply. This could be due in part to warring parties blocking aid and commercial food deliveries to areas supporting their enemies, despite the fact that such a practice breaks international humanitarian law.

Conflict also leads to lack of food supply for populations as people become displaced and forced from their homes, jobs, and income and thus cannot buy food to feed themselves. Displaced farmers are also unable to produce their normal crops, contributing still more to food shortages in certain countries.

Food insecurity is a major threat to world peace and could potentially incite violent conflict between countries across the world. Thus, the U.N. and other governmental bodies are desperately trying to find ways to solve the problem before it becomes something they cannot control.

### Spillover

#### Regardless of will, resource limitations force abandonment of current cases AND prevent enforcement.

Baker et al. ’20 [Jonathan, Bill Baer, Michael Kades, Fiona Morton, Nancy Rose, Carl Shapiro, Tim Wu; November 19; Professor of Law at American University, former Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission, Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University, J.D. from Harvard University; Visiting Fellow in Governance Studies, former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust at the U.S. Department of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Competition at the Federal Trade Commission, J.D. from Stanford University; Director of Markets and Competition Policy at the Equitable Growth Foundation, J.D. from the University of Wisconsin; Professor of Economics at ale University, Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor of Applied Economics, Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor of Business Strategy at the University of California, Berkeley; Special Assistant to the President for Technology and Competition Policy in the National Economic Council, J.D. from Harvard Law School; Washington Center for Equitable Growth, “Restoring competition in the United States,” <https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/restoring-competition-in-the-united-states/>]

Limited Resources Constrain Enforcement Activity

Over the course of the previous decade, total appropriations to the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division barely grew in nominal terms. Antitrust appropriations have been nearly flat in the past decade, despite nearly 40 percent growth in U.S. Gross Domestic Product. (See Figure 1.) The Antitrust Division had 25 percent fewer full-time employees in 2019 than it did 10 years earlier.[22](https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/restoring-competition-in-the-united-states/?longform=true#footnote-22) And the Federal Trade Commission has roughly the same number of full-time employees as it did in 2009.[23](https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/restoring-competition-in-the-united-states/?longform=true#footnote-23)

This austerity occurred even while the need for antitrust enforcement grew as market power in the U.S. economy grew. Merger filings increased dramatically; civil antitrust enforcement was flat.[24](https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/restoring-competition-in-the-united-states/?longform=true#footnote-24) (See Figure 2.)

The two antitrust agencies were no more aggressive, and probably less aggressive, in bringing cases, with the exception of hospital mergers and challenging pharmaceutical patent settlements.[25](https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/restoring-competition-in-the-united-states/?longform=true#footnote-25) At the same to time, the enforcement actions that did happen required the government to try more cases to judgment, despite being no more aggressive in case selection.[26](https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/restoring-competition-in-the-united-states/?longform=true#footnote-26) That combination of flat appropriations, more trials, but no more aggressive enforcement agenda indicates that the agencies’ budgets have sharply limited their capacity to bring antitrust cases.

Resource limitations also undermine the agencies’ mission in other ways. One way to improve enforcement, for example, is through merger retrospectives, which study the impact of mergers, enforcement actions, and settlements. In the past, such studies helped the Federal Trade Commission reinvigorate its enforcement effort against hospital mergers.27 Regularly, there are calls for more retrospectives, but those studies are time-consuming and data-intensive, and thus expensive. Current budgets limit the agencies’ ability to fulfill these responsibilities as well.

#### There’s zero slack---new initiatives trade off.

Nylen ’20 [Leah; December 10; Antitrust journalist; Politico, “FTC suffering a cash crunch as it prepares to battle Facebook,” <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/10/ftc-cash-facebook-lawsuit-444468>]

The agency released the emails in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

In a follow-up email on Nov. 17, Robbins told staff that the agency had frozen all promotions for the foreseeable future, along with hiring and the bonuses or additional time-off awards that the FTC normally gives out at the end of December. The FTC had asked the Office of Personnel Management — the human resources management policy shop for the federal civil service — for permission to offer buy-outs or early retirement options but was denied, he said.

“[I]t should be no secret that the agency will have to make some tough choices in an environment where we simply do not have the funds to do everything we might like to do,” Robbins said in his first email to staff about the budget situation on Sept. 29.

The FTC declined to comment Thursday on Robbins’ emails or its budget situation. But Edith Ramirez, who chaired the agency under President Barack Obama, said Robbins’ emails about the budget picture were “concerning.”

“It does not serve the public interest for the agency not to be able to bring the cases it believes should be brought because of budget limitations,” said Ramirez, now a partner at the law firm Hogan Lovells.

### Link Wall

#### Adding a single case takes up fifty percent of resources---there’s minimal slack now and Congress will deny requests.

Kantrowitz ’20 [Alex; September 17; Author and reporter, B.A. from Cornell University; Medium, “‘It’s Ridiculous’: Underfunded U.S. Regulators Can’t Keep Fighting the Tech Giants Like This,” <https://onezero.medium.com/its-ridiculous-underfunded-u-s-regulators-can-t-keep-fighting-the-tech-giants-like-this-3b57487b4d63>]

“When I was there, the privacy wing had maybe 50 people, and that’s probably generous. That’s lawyers, support staff, everyone,” Justin Brookman, the former policy director at the FTC’s office of technology research and investigation, told Big Technology. “If they were to bring a case, that would tie up half the resources of the group. And they had two litigations ongoing and that took up most of everyone’s time.” The agency’s budget has barely increased since Brookman left in 2017, while the tech giants have added trillions of dollars to their market caps.

Inside the FTC and DOJ, employees are aware of the tech giants’ ability to fight, and the corporations’ budgets tend to live inside their heads. “Facebook will have the ability to raise every single issue, if they want to,” Kades said. “It doesn’t have to be a winner, doesn’t have to be close to winner. If they wanted to take this position in litigation, they can make every procedural maneuver difficult, they can not cooperate on discovery, they can fight on scheduling, they don’t have to win even half of those, but it would just suck up resources.” The ability to do this, not even the action itself, can impact regulators’ thinking.

Agency staffers are typically mission-driven and knowingly work for salaries below private-sector rates, but the resource-rich tech giants are now poaching directly from agencies at a rate remarkable even for Washington’s revolving door between the private and public sector.

Kate Patchen, a DOJ antitrust chief, went directly to Facebook in 2018. Bryson Bachman, a high-ranking attorney in the DOJ’s antitrust division, became a senior counsel at Amazon in 2018. Scott Fitzgerald, who worked in the DOJ’s antitrust division for nearly 13 years, became a corporate counsel working on regulation for Amazon this May. At the FTC, senior attorney Laura Berger moved to Microsoft in 2018 to become a privacy director for LinkedIn. And Nithan Sannappa, a well-regarded attorney in the agency’s division of privacy and identity protection left for Twitter in 2017 and is now a lawyer for Google.

The FTC declined to comment. The DOJ did not respond to an inquiry.

Hiring this type of talent gives the tech giants a major advantage in their effort to fend off regulation. Ashkan Soltani, a former chief technologist at the FTC, recalled agency lawyers hugging a former colleague who was working for the tech giants as an outside counsel as they prepared to face off in court. “They would have a really personal relationship with staff, which is kind of awkward,” he said. “And they’d know, in detail, all of the cases that the agency has currently and would be able to advise their clients whether to push hard on an issue or not.”

Ultimately, Congress is responsible for funding these agencies, and its lack of action in this regard makes its hearings and tough questioning of tech giant CEOs a little hollow. Getting Bezos to sweat in a made-for-YouTube interrogation pales in comparison to Congress’s responsibility to properly fund the regulators. None of five members of Congress contacted for this story, including some of the most theatrical in the hearings, agreed to comment.

#### Litigation snowballs, dragging the FTC in protracted legal and hiring fights.

Burke ’21 [Andrea and Henry; May 28; B.A. in Political Science and Labor Studies from the University of California at Los Angeles; Research Assistant, B.A. in Economics from the University of Maryland; Revolving Door Project, “Hobbled FTC Lacks Budget to Combat Corporate Buying Spree,” <https://therevolvingdoorproject.org/hobbled-ftc-lacks-budget-to-combat-corporate-buying-spree/>]

According to Revolving Door Project’s analysis, FTC appropriations have consistently declined since 2010, when the agency’s discretionary budget authority was $205 million. In the following years the number declined significantly from $205 million in FY 2010 to $180 in FY 2015 and $168 in FY 2019. Accounting for inflation, the decrease between FY 2010 and FY 2019 funding for the FTC amounted to a cut in discretionary appropriations of 30%.

Despite the decrease in discretionary funding, the agency has seen its overall budget increase slightly as a result of the increased merger filing fees that it receives. These are not enough to keep pace with the massive increase in caseload for the agency from which they result. As the fee schedule was implemented in 2001, the filing fees for mergers are far too low to cover the cost of the FTC’s investigations. In a 2021 statement on filing fees, acting Chair Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Commissioner Rohit Chopra [stated](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1587163/p859910_concurring_statement_of_ac_slaughter_and_c_chopra_re_revised_hsr_thresholds.pdf) that the mega-mergers regulated by the agency “require more resources and staff. For example, large retail or service mergers often require investigation into dozens of geographic markets and large pharmaceutical or industrial mergers often require investigation into a dozen or more product markets.”

The Democratic commissioners specifically identify the need for experts to carry out investigations and litigation, noting “the amount of money the FTC spends on expert costs has risen dramatically over the last several years.” As new technologies are developed, the FTC’s investigations are bound to become more complex, necessitating higher funding altogether for hiring more technologists, economists and other experts. Although the FTC is known for an aversion to costly litigation (a fact which corporations use to their advantage), increased funding would also allow the agency to hire more attorneys to carry out challenges in court.

However, due to declining discretionary funding and fees not keeping up with inflation, the FTC has been forced to expend far fewer resources on each investigation than it had in prior years. The appearance of a budget increase since 2010 needs to be reconciled with the reality that the agency has been crushed under an increased caseload many times larger than the nominal increase in budget.

### Thumpers

#### Biden is all talk---actual policy signals deference to corporate consolidation in every sector.

Stoller ’21 [Matt; April 29; Research Director of the American Economic Liberties Project, author; Substack, “Is Biden Accidentally Giving the Green Light to Mega-Mergers?” <https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/is-biden-accidentally-giving-the>]

Today I’m going to write about the Biden administration’s first major antitrust move, a clearance of a giant pharmaceutical merger which signaled to Wall Street that Biden hasn’t made antitrust a priority. It’s not the worst news, but it’s not good news.

Before that, a little house-keeping. First, Brian Barrett at Wired wrote [a good piece](https://www.wired.com/story/logitech-harmony-smart-remote-lost-its-way/) on how Logitech’s Harmony monopoly killed the universal remote control industry, going into more detail than I did a [few weeks ago](https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/why-logitech-just-killed-the-universal) on the same subject. Second, last year I [wrote up a board game monopoly roll-up](https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/weird-monopolies-and-roll-ups-horse) by a firm called Asmodee, which owns Settlers of Catan. Paul Tullis at Bloomberg [did a more thorough job](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-13/board-game-maker-asmodee-behind-catan-pandemic-ticket-to-ride-corners-market?sref=q0qR8k34) last week on how they’ve done through the pandemic.

And now…

Mega-Merger Mania

A number of sources have told me that the merger space is the busiest they’ve ever seen, which is probably a result of being able to borrow a lot of money cheaply (courtesy of the Federal Reserve). Wall Street knows it. “It’s the busiest I’ve ever known it,” Farah O’Brien, a private equity and M&A partner at Latham & Watkins [told](https://www.ft.com/content/bacdf86f-e786-4439-966e-f5958adb1c59) the Financial Times. “There’s a ton of capital that is desperately trying to find a home. I wouldn’t say there’s caution in the market at all.”

It’s happening in every sector, from lithium mining to electric utilities to [semiconductors](https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-starts-national-security-probe-of-nvidia-s-40-billion-deal-to-buy-arm-11618837683) to pharmaceuticals. Mergers tend to lead to layoffs, higher prices, less innovation and research, and a more brittle supply chain, and they amplify the control monopolies have over our society. There are even weird new ways of self-dealing via mergers, like the trend of private equity funds [selling their](https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1r14ljp32b2ly/Private-Equity-Firms-Used-to-Sell-Half-Their-Companies-to-Their-Competitors-Now-They-re-Selling-Them-Back-to-Themselves) own portfolio companies to themselves, and the new cheating special of 2021, the special-purpose acquisition companies, or SPAC. The details of how are not particularly important, suffice to say that what is happening is a massive transfer of wealth and power to a small group, far beyond the inequality we’ve known.

#### 1. They’re not binding.

Holding et al. ’21 [Christopher, Paul Jin, Andrew Lacy, Arman Goodwin; July 15; Experts at JD Supra, a daily source of legal intelligence on all topics business and personal, distributing news, commentary, and analysis from leading lawyers; JD Supra, “Biden Executive Order Calls for Heightened Antitrust Scrutiny,” <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/biden-executive-order-calls-for-7783960/>]

Key Implications

* Revised horizontal and vertical merger guidelines are expected, which will likely implement a much more aggressive approach to deals. Note, however, that agency merger guidelines are not binding on courts and merger challenges under more aggressive theories may be met with skeptical courts;
* Anticipate delays in HSR review especially for deals in industries singled out by the Order (e.g., tech, pharma, healthcare, among others), even if competitive overlaps are minimal;
* Deals not subject to HSR filing requirements, even when purchase prices are relatively low, should be reviewed by antitrust specialists to assess risk, especially in the sectors identified in the Order;

#### 2. They’ll be abandoned due to immediate judicial opposition.

McLaughlin ’21 [David; June 23; Reporter; Bloomberg Businessweek, “Antitrust Crusader Lina Khan Faces a Big Obstacle: The Courts,” <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-23/tech-antitrust-lina-khan-faces-courts-as-challenge-to-ftc-s-progressive-agenda>]

Instead, hours after the Senate confirmed her, Biden put the 32-year-old Khan—one of the [most prominent antagonists of big business](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-26/how-big-is-bad-has-become-a-big-big-deal)—in charge of the agency, where she’ll be responsible for challenging mergers and taking on companies when they use their market muscle to snuff out competition.

Now comes the hard part: putting her agenda into action. The biggest hurdle, say antitrust experts, is a judiciary that has made it very difficult for competition watchdogs to win ambitious cases. And to make any change of consequence, whether breaking up a monopoly or stopping a takeover, enforcers must prevail in court.

“None of that is easy, and it’s particularly not easy when courts are very conservative, as they are today,” says Stephen Calkins, a law professor at Wayne State University and a former general counsel at the FTC. “She’s certainly talked about breaking up companies but, my golly, that’s incredibly hard to do.”

Khan made her mark in 2017, with a [law review article](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/amazons-antitrust-paradox) she wrote while still a student at Yale Law School. Titled “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,” it traced how the online retailer came to control key infrastructure of the digital economy and how traditional antitrust analysis fails to consider the danger to competition the company poses. The paper was widely talked about in antitrust circles and was read by senior enforcement officials.

U.S. tech titans are at the center of the antitrust debate in Washington. They are ever more powerful, with [Apple Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/AAPL:US), [Amazon.com Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/AMZN:US), [Alphabet Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GOOGL:US), and [Facebook Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FB:US) among the top 10 largest companies in the world, by market value. A House of Representatives investigation last year accused the companies of [abusing their dominance](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-06/house-panel-calls-for-sweeping-antitrust-reforms-for-big-tech) to thwart competition, and lawmakers are considering a [raft of bills](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-11/u-s-tech-giants-would-have-to-exit-businesses-under-house-plan) to impose new rules on how the companies operate. Federal antitrust enforcers and state attorneys general have sued Google and Facebook for what authorities say are monopoly abuses.

Khan, who was counsel to the House antitrust committee during its probe, was one of the main authors of the House [report](https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf). It recommended a series of reforms to antitrust laws that she and anti-monopoly activists have long championed, like restricting which markets the companies can operate in and requiring them to treat other businesses on their platforms fairly and without favoritism.

Khan’s work helped revolutionize competition-policy debates and shift support for a more forceful approach that abandoned the playbook inspired decades ago by Robert Bork, the conservative legal scholar and judge. That framework came to be known as the consumer welfare standard and relies on price effects as the measure of competitive harm. Khan argued in her paper for a new approach, focused on the competitive process and the structure of markets, that she said would more fully capture harms that the consumer welfare standard misses.

Once considered on the fringes of antitrust thinking, Khan and her acolytes—often dubbed the New Brandeis School, after Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis—are now firmly mainstream with Khan’s appointment as FTC chairwoman.

The FTC has suffered some stinging defeats recently. Last year, the agency lost a major monopoly case filed against chipmaker [Qualcomm](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/QCOM:US). In April, a unanimous Supreme Court eliminated a tool used by the FTC to recover money for defrauded consumers. Later this month, a federal judge in Washington is expected to rule on whether the agency’s monopoly lawsuit against Facebook can proceed.

Still, there’s widespread agreement that the status quo is no longer tenable. Over the last two decades, concentration has risen in industries across the economy. Some economists say dominant companies can use their market power to suppress wages, for example, exacerbating inequality. The worries are bipartisan. Republicans and Democrats alike are pushing for antitrust reforms to rein in the biggest tech platforms, and Khan was confirmed by the Senate with significant Republican support.

Big losses in the courts would eventually hurt Khan’s authority and demoralize her staff, says William Kovacic, a former FTC chairman who now teaches at George Washington University Law School. “You become like a sports team that is known to its opponents as unable to win,” he says. But defeats also could provide the foundation for the kind of sweeping antitrust legislation that Khan and her supporters want.

“If you want to change the world, at some point it goes to the courts or it goes to the legislature,” Kovacic says. “But you can’t do it by yourself.”